

For Reference

**NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM**

# For Reference

---

NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

EX LIBRIS  
UNIVERSITATIS  
ALBERTAENSIS





Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2019 with funding from  
University of Alberta Libraries

<https://archive.org/details/humanismasmodern00orvi>







THESIS  
114-4 (5)  
8-72

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

HUMANISM AS A MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL TREND

AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

IN THE TEACHING OF ART

---

A Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of Graduate Studies

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Education

Department of Educational Foundations

---

by

Orville A. Stratte

Edmonton, Alberta

September, 1964



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author's expression of gratitude, which goes beyond the formality of acknowledgment, is extended to the members of his thesis committee for both their patience and their encouragement.

His appreciation is also extended to Dr. Corliss Lamont who gave him the first inspiration to undertake this study, to Dr. Kaikhosrov Irani of New York University who, as a friend, provided encouraging suggestions, and to his wife, Margaret, who accompanied him every step of the way.



UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Humanism as a Modern Philosophical Trend and Its Implications in the Teaching of Art," submitted by ORVILLE A. STRATTE, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education.

---



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE PROBLEM . . . . .	1
An Increasing Public Interest in Art . . . . .	1
Art in the School Considered a "Frill" . . . . .	4
A Time for Change in Art Education . . . . .	5
Purposes of this Study . . . . .	6
II. THE HUMANIST TREND IN MODERN THOUGHT . . . . .	8
Definition and Description of Naturalistic	
Humanism . . . . .	8
The Humanist Concept of Reality . . . . .	11
The Humanist Concept of Knowledge . . . . .	13
The Humanist Concept of Value . . . . .	16
Educational Implications of the Humanist	
Concepts . . . . .	18
III. A COMPARISON OF EARLIER HUMANISM AND THE	
MODERN . . . . .	20
Reasons for the Failure of Earlier Humanist	
Philosophy . . . . .	20
The Place of Art in the Modern Humanist	
Trend . . . . .	23
The Development of Humanistic Art in the	
Renaissance (Two Parallel Lines) . . . . .	25
Problems of Today Seen as Parallels to	
those of the Renaissance . . . . .	29



CHAPTER	PAGE
IV. A HUMANIST AESTHETIC PHILOSOPHY . . . . .	32
Reason and Experience as the Basis of the	
Philosophy of Naturalistic Humanism . . .	32
The Humanist's Criticism of "Speculative	
Philosophy" . . . . .	34
The Humanist's Recognition of a "Unification	
Theory" . . . . .	36
The Distinction between Symbol and Concept	
Dependent on Freedom of Expression . . . .	39
The Urge for Unification as the Basis of	
Humanist Aesthetics . . . . .	42
Illustration of the Aesthetic Theory of	
Unification Applied to Modern Art . . . .	44
V. THE CREATIVE PROCESS AND ITS RELATION TO VALUE	48
Communication by Symbols . . . . .	48
Origin of the Creative Process . . . . .	50
Artistic Symbols and Linguistic Signs . . .	51
Unification in Non-linguistic Expression . .	52
Need for a System of Aesthetic Values . . .	55
VI. CONCEPTS FUNDAMENTAL TO HUMANIST AESTHETICS .	60
An Invariable Residuum . . . . .	60
Design . . . . .	62
Form . . . . .	62
Subject-Matter . . . . .	64



CHAPTER	PAGE
Content . . . . .	65
Good Art and Bad, Art and Non-art . . . . .	65
Unification of Perceptual, Emotional, and Intellectual Pattern . . . . .	66
The Significance of these Concepts Today . .	69
VII. AESTHETIC EMOTION . . . . .	71
Opposition to the Hypothesis of Bell and Fry regarding a Unique Aesthetic Emotion . . .	71
Aesthetic Emotion as a Resultant of Feelings Rather than an Esoteric Sense . . . . .	72
Opposition to Tolstoy's Isolation of Common Emotions in Artistic Communication . . . .	73
A Fault Common to Bell and Tolstoy in Assuming Unity of Emotion as Apriori . . .	75
The Parting of the Way for Bell and Fry . .	76
The Importance of the Familiar rather than the Unusual regarding Subject-matter . . .	77
VIII. ESSENTIALS OF A WORKABLE THEORY OF ART . . . .	80
Resolution of the Positions Held by Bell, Fry, Tolstoy, and the Humanist	
(a) non-discursive function of art	
(b) unlimited nature of content	
(c) communicative value of art	
(d) significance of form	
(e) significance of content . . . . .	80



Great Art	(a) social aspect of art	
	(b) good art	
	(c) amoral quality of art	
	(d) sincerity rather than amusement	
	(e) relativism of values	
	(f) consistency of form	
	(g) infectiousness of content .	83

#### Reasons for Failure in Art

(a) technical inadequacy	
(b) inappropriate symbols	
(c) belabored symbolism	
(d) insufficient content	
(e) lack of simplification (overloaded symbols)	
(f) lack of restraint	
(g) lack of education of spectators	
(h) failure regarding relationship of form and content . . . . .	87

### IX. HUMANIST OBJECTIVES IN THE SCHOOL'S ART PROGRAM 92

Aesthetic Experience as a Synthesis of the Perceptual, Emotional, and Intellectual .	92
Creative Self-Expression and Individual Worth . . . . .	93
Cultural Interchange and Promotion of Understanding, Respect, and Sympathy . . .	96



CHAPTER	PAGE
"Means" to be Taken Tentatively as "Minor Objectives" . . . . .	100
The First Stage in the Educative Process:	
Random Free Expression . . . . .	102
The Second Stage: Refinement through Simplification, Exaggeration and Comparative Studies . . . .	104
The Third Stage: Technical Studies	
(a) Analytical Study of Subject Matter	
(b) Perfection of Techniques . . . . .	106
The Fourth Stage: Enrichment of Personal and Community Life . . . . .	108
The Future of the Art Program . . . . .	109
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	111
APPENDIX . . . . .	116



## PREFACE

The purposes of this thesis are presented in Chapter I; however, it seems worthwhile to indicate the focus of attention which the author wishes to emphasize. Although the philosophic position of Humanism is given in some detail in Chapters II, III, and IV, this background is presented in order to make more significant the views expressed regarding the general nature of the artistic process and the specific objectives of a sound art program in the schools (Chapters V and IX inclusive).

Since the Humanist's use of the term "artistic communication" is dealt with at such length in the final chapters that its significance may be lost, it seems pertinent to draw attention to it here. He does not use the term as a reference to the view that a work of art must "say something" which can be verbally articulated. That is, he does not believe that art is purely ideational. He implies that communication through art involves to some extent the perceptual, the emotional, and the ideational. At its highest level it involves all three.



## CHAPTER I

### THE PROBLEM

It would seem that people in Alberta are more interested in art than they previously were. A local newspaper's content is a reliable indicator of popular taste. A newspaper must sell and so must cater to popular demand.

A survey of the coverage on the Arts in The Edmonton Journal for the past twenty years provides some interesting statistics. A content analysis of the first week in April of each year yielded the following comparative data. From 1943 to 1947 inclusive, the average weekly coverage on Art<sup>1</sup> was 15.8 inches; from 1960 to 1964, it was 87.4 inches. the average weekly coverage for all of the Arts<sup>2</sup> during the early period was 70.25 inches; whereas in the latter period, it was 298.7 inches. In all, the total coverage on the Arts increased by over 400 per cent, and the specific coverage on

---

<sup>1</sup>The term "Art", as used in this thesis, refers to the graphic arts and sculpture; that is, to the application of skill and taste in the production of beautiful drawings, paintings, engravings, or sculpture. "Graphic art" is confined to productions made on flat surfaces.

<sup>2</sup>"The Arts", as used in this survey, include Art, Music, Drama and Literary Works.



Art increased over 500 per cent during the twenty-year period.<sup>3</sup>

The articles on Art can also be compared. From 1943 to 1947, the content was almost exclusively social, rather than aesthetic. (For example, a list of prominent people who attended the opening of an exhibition or poured tea was given). Only once was art featured on the front page. (The occasion was a presentation to the National Gallery from the Prime Minister of Canada.) On April 2, 1945, the Journal included an article on "(Art) Museum to Move from Civic Block," which was concerned in entirety with the re-shuffling of office space to the advantage of the Welfare Department, Edmonton Trade and Labor Council, and the Red Cross. (No mention was made of the advantages which a city might gain from a flourishing Art Gallery.)

During this four-year period an occasional editorial comment, or a quotation from a guest speaker, drew attention to the importance of art. On April 4, 1945, an editorial referred to the "solid achievement" of the Edmonton Art Club and called for a suitable gallery. On April 3, 1945 a news item quoted a guest speaker, Mr. H. C. Gourley as saying "Canadian art during the past two years has enjoyed a particularly great market throughout the Dominion. Art

---

<sup>3</sup>Appendix A: Table Summarizing the Survey on the Coverage on Art in The Edmonton Journal.



in this country is especially influenced by the geography, the history and the different racial groups."

By 1960 the emphasis in content had changed significantly: the social aspect had become incidental, and the aesthetic had come into its own. The depth and the breadth of an awakened interest in Art were proclaimed in bold headlines. On April 2, 1960, a caption to a 32½-inch article read: "Edmontonians Take Up Arts: 8,000 Dance, Act, Paint." Other headlines in the 1960 to 1964 period read: "Ponoka Art Club Ends Successful Season," "Short Course in Drawing Held at Yellowknife," "(Arts and Crafts) Exhibit Shown in Grande Prairie," "Ukrainian Handicrafts Sold," "Art Display at Barrhead," "(Allied Arts Commission) List Recreation Plans at Grande Prairie," "European Art on Display," and "Junior Art Festival at the Jubilee Auditorium." Articles also appeared which raised questions regarding the nature of the work of the artist: "Perfection One Aim of Artist," "Creative Tot Is Neglected," "Painters Owe Style to Defective Eyesight," and "Don't Paint Without Meaning." One comment read, "The important thing is that this (exhibition) is part of Canada seen through the eyes of some of the people who live in Edmonton" (Editorial, April 3, 1964). Another news story (April 1, 1963) reported a conference which raised the direct question, "Should the artist cater to the taste or demands of the public?"



These changing newspaper emphases of recent years indicate that art has become a part of the everyday life of many of the people. When new buildings of importance are opened, full pages are devoted to the event with considerable emphasis being given to the aesthetic features. Numerous advertisements publicize private galleries, studios, and schools offering instruction in the arts.

It seems evident that people have come to respect art as an integral part of Western cultural expression. This changing emphasis is reflected in the multi-million-dollar architectural projects, in the money spent on attractive commercial lay-outs, in the number of large murals appearing in public buildings, and in the number of parents who support the many private schools concerned solely with the Arts. But, has art come, to the same extent, to the Alberta public schools?

Educational change generally lags behind economic and social change. However, it seems that the time has come for educational forces to take advantage of the favorable social and intellectual climate. One step in this direction was taken in 1958, when a curriculum subcommittee under the chairmanship of M. W. MacDonald (a prominent Edmonton artist and Supervisor of Art Education for the Edmonton Schools) produced the first detailed course of studies in Art for Alberta schools.



However, this one step could not effect the miracle of providing the vitality in art education which it should have. The early lack of public sympathy for art seems to have resulted in art education being branded as "a frill".<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, through the years, it has become a rather lifeless classroom activity; routine and apathy have characterized many art education programs.<sup>5</sup> Such "mis-education" served neither a utilitarian nor an aesthetic purpose. It is this type of art education that the public now calls "a frill". But that same public should be ready to call it by another name if it is revitalized and redefined.

It remains to the educator who is interested in art to give direction to a new development in the teaching of art. He knows that the public is ready, that the province is rich, and that the artistic potential is here -- but does he know where he is going? If he is to point a direction, it seems that he should have a definitive philosophy, intelligible to both the artist and the public.<sup>6</sup> Such a

---

<sup>4</sup>Appendix B: A Parental Opinion Survey in the Pincher Creek School Division.

<sup>5</sup>Appendix C: The Annual Reports of the Department of Education On Inspection and Supervision regarding the Teaching of Art.

<sup>6</sup>Oliver L. Reiser, Man's New Image of Man (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1961), pp. 6 - 9. Professor Reiser declares that America has been culturally backwards, that its arts have appeared "random, superficial and uninfluential," and that it must develop a philosophy for itself "that will measure up to the opportunities of the New Age."



philosophy should promote a sympathetic communication through art. With such a diversity of ethnic groups as is found in Alberta, the task of defining a common philosophic viewpoint seems all the more important. The school might, through its art education, help the Canadian people to capitalize on the incalculable wealth of its diverse cultures.

A main purpose of this study was to consider one trend in modern thought and to determine how it might serve as a core to help in unifying this diversity. The trend, designated as Naturalistic Humanism, seems to have gained strength recently. The proponents of the modern Humanism maintain that it is the philosophical basis of democracy.<sup>7</sup> It takes a definite position regarding metaphysical and ethical philosophy; however, as Dr. Lamont once remarked, no one has attempted to postulate an aesthetic theory for the new Humanistic outlook.<sup>8</sup>

This study, to provide a significant theoretical

---

<sup>7</sup>Corliss Lamont, The Philosophy of Humanism (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), p. 227.

<sup>8</sup>The place of Dr. Lamont in the main stream of Naturalistic Humanism is established in the following reference: Corliss Lamont (ed.), "A Humanist Symposium on Metaphysics," The Journal of Philosophy, (January 15, 1959), p. 45 ff. Dr. Lamont was asked to head this symposium which included top names associated with Naturalistic Humanism: Roy Wood Sellars; John H. Randall, Max C. Otto; Gardner Williams; and Julian Huxley. The first two named were original signatories of the Humanist Manifesto of 1933.



base, begins with a discussion of a number of relevant questions. What is the origin of the modern Humanist philosophy? What is its central philosophical position upon which its aesthetic theory must rest? What are the short-comings of earlier Humanistic thinking, which modern Humanism must avoid? How significant is art in the Humanistic world?

This study also attempts to define an aesthetic philosophy consistent with the basic tenets of Naturalistic Humanism. Pertinent questions again arise. How does the basis of Humanist aesthetic thought differ from that of influential aesthetic theories? What might be the core of a Humanist theory of art? From the point of view of the Humanist, what is the nature of the creative process? What are the fundamental concepts which provide a basis for distinguishing good art from bad and art from non-art? Since emotion is traditionally related to art, what is the Humanist's concept of aesthetic emotion? Generally, what are the essentials of a workable theory of art?

Finally, this study lists a number of objectives in the school's art program that a Humanist aesthetic philosophy would suggest. Without using indoctrination, how can the Humanist aesthetic theory assist the teacher in implementing a successful program of art in an Alberta school?



## CHAPTER II

## THE HUMANISTIC TREND IN MODERN THOUGHT

The development of Naturalistic Humanism has stemmed from many influences both past and present.<sup>9</sup> It accepts the relativism of the Protagorean doctrine that "man is the measure of all things." It strips the Christian principle of the brotherhood of man free from its supernatural compulsions and makes it a human code of moral obligation. It underlines the Erasmian proclamation that the highest aim and duty of every individual is to develop his particular capabilities to the utmost in order that he may render the greatest possible service to his community. It further emulates the intellectual vitality of the European Renaissance and persistently avows a determination to remain free from religious control of knowledge, it places complete reliance on the scientific method which it would apply to all human problems. It embraces those philosophies of Reason which, since the 17th Century, espoused the cause of human freedom and the belief in human achievement.<sup>10</sup> In fact, as noted previously it proclaims itself to be the philosophy basic to democracy.

---

<sup>9</sup>Lamont, op. cit.: The description of modern Humanism found in this chapter is based mainly on Lamont's study, The Philosophy of Humanism.

<sup>10</sup>Appendix D: A Humanist Manifesto (1933).



Curtis W. Reese declares the indebtedness of modern thought to various types of humanism which have appeared:

Humanism claims, with due reticence, that it is the natural outgrowth of the major Humanist traditions: cultural Humanism, with its emphasis on non-theological social processes; scientific Humanism, with its emphasis on the control of natural processes for human ends; democratic Humanism, with its regard for each person as an end in himself; religious Humanism, with its fervent loyalty to good works; and philosophical Humanism, with its insistence on "man the measure."<sup>11</sup>

Lamont, in acknowledging the existence of other types of humanistic thought, points out features which are not in accord with the Naturalistic view. The academic or classical type places heavy emphasis on intellectual heritage to the detriment of intellectual advancement. Thomistic Humanism opposes a man-centred philosophy. Subjective Humanism compromises with supernaturalism and rejects objective truth. However, having proclaimed the Naturalistic type as the main stream of modern Humanistic thinking, Lamont concludes his historical survey with these words:

I have treated only the highlights of the great Humanist tradition in philosophy, religion and culture, calling attention to the fact that some of the main illustrious minds of the past have been in essence Humanist. Modern Humanism is proud of this long tradition that gives it an impressive continuity reaching back to ancient Greece and Rome, and coming down through the European Renaissance, through the French Enlightenment, through the flowering of nineteenth-century Western culture to many eminent thinkers of our time. Present-day Humanism offers its philosophy to the world, not with any pretensions of having attained intellectual finality, yet

---

<sup>11</sup>Curtis W. Reese, The Meaning of Humanism (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1945), p. 19.



with the hope and belief that it can serve as a rallying point for men of intelligence and good will in our modern era.<sup>12</sup>

Lamont briefly defines twentieth-century Humanism as "a philosophy of joyous service for the greater good of all humanity in this natural world and according to the methods of reason and democracy."<sup>13</sup> He then summarizes its ten main tenets. First, holding to a naturalistic metaphysics that rules out all forms of the supernatural, it regards Nature as the totality of being and as a constantly changing system of matter and energy, existing independently of any mind or consciousness. Second, on the basis of scientific facts, it regards man as an evolutionary product of Nature with an inseparable unity of body and personality. Third, it believes that man, relying primarily on reason and the scientific method, has the potentiality of solving his own problems and of enlarging his knowledge of the truth. Fourth, in opposition to all theories of universal determinism, it believes that man, possessing freedom of creative choice and action, is within certain objective limits, master of his own destiny. Fifth, it is dedicated to those ethical values which are based on earthly experience and to a goal of worldly happiness, freedom and progress for all mankind.

---

<sup>12</sup>Lamont, op. cit., p. 66.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 10 - 11.



Sixth, it maintains that the good life for the individual consists of personal satisfaction and continuous self-development combined with significant contribution to the welfare of the community. Seventh, its aesthetic philosophy aspires to the widest possible development of art and the awareness of beauty, so that aesthetic experience may become a pervasive reality in the life of man. Eighth, it stands for universal peace and unity in a democratic world. Ninth, it advocates complete social implementation of reason and the scientific method, as well as the use of democratic procedures, ensuring freedom of expression and civil liberties throughout all areas of economic, political and cultural life. Tenth, regarding human thought, it maintains that ideas do not exist independently but have reality only when a living organism in interaction with its environment is intellectually active; and, in accordance with the scientific method, it believes in the unending questioning of basic assumptions.

Germane to this thesis is a consideration of the Humanist's concept of reality, of knowledge, and of value, which are developed on the basis of these tenets.

A Humanist symposium reported in the January 15, 1959, publication of The Journal of Philosophy set out to determine "a sound metaphysics to meet the test of rigorous reasoning and consistent with the findings of empirical



science."<sup>14</sup> The twelve irreducible traits of existence which were outlined established a Humanist concept of reality. First, substance is the over-all term for the infinitely varied manifestations and modes of matter and energy throughout the universe. Second, activity or motion implies that substance is always in flux -- however inert it may appear. Third, all varieties of substance are particles or combinations of particles having dimension in terms of mass, volume, duration, or other quantitative measurements. Fourth, quality or attribute is a trait of every existent -- although some special structure may be required to detect it. Fifth, form, pattern, or organization identifies every manifestation of substance but does not exist apart from matter or energy. Sixth, potentiality or capacity is possessed by every form in that it has the inherent possibility of activity, interaction or development. Seventh, every existent is subject to causality -- functioning as cause when it is operating as an active agent, and as effect when some other agent is acting upon it. Eighth, necessity affirms scientifically established cause-effect laws as regularities in Nature but infers that natural laws are deterministic only when the necessary and sufficient conditions are present. Ninth, contingency or chance is the category

---

<sup>14</sup>Lamont (ed.) loc. cit.



which points to the pervasive intersections of independent causal sequences, accounting in part for the emergence of novelty. Tenth, individuality in characteristics, in time-space position, and in relationship with the rest of existence, indicates that the universe is pluralistic, having no all-pervasive unity. Eleventh, relation is the characteristic of every event or entity presenting such dynamic aspects as interaction, synthesis, and continuity. Twelfth, eventuation or outcome is the category which denotes the continuous process of events in terms of successive effects -- these outcomes may be either retrogressive or advancing in the light of human values.

It is significant to note that the Humanist does not include such concepts as mind, purpose, or good as basic traits or controlling forces in the universe. He considers them, not as irreducible ultimates, but as characteristics belonging only to man or highly-developed organic forms. In his book Quest for Certainty, John Dewey declares that the good, the true, and the beautiful exist only as man creates them -- they have no antecedent existence.

Reality to the Humanist is simply the totality of Nature, of which man is a part. Everything real must be moving substance; that is, all things are matter and energy in a constant state of motion, interaction, synthesis or development, according to the cause-effect relationships



to which they are subjected. All things have not only dimensions and attributes by which their forms or organizations are identifiable as to species, but also traits of individuality making every existence unique. However, since nothing exists in isolation, there is perpetual continuity in the cause-effect process of events which includes, by pure chance, the frequent interaction of independent causal sequences having no common cause. The totality of Nature then must be considered not so much "what is" as "what is becoming."

The Humanist's concept of knowledge, in keeping with his metaphysics, denies the attainability of absolute truth. There are no First Principles, but only postulates which are continually tentative. Knowledge is concerned with varying degrees of probability, which serve as dependable guides to action. Knowledge is based entirely on human experience in the natural world. Truth is attained when it becomes possible to attribute to things and events a verifiable meaning in terms of their precise behavior, of their causes and effects, or of their other relationships. Meaning or idea is verified as true "if, in acting upon it, we find that it accomplishes, in terms of consequences, what it purports to accomplish."<sup>15</sup> In determining truth,

---

<sup>15</sup>Lamont, op. cit., pp. 182 - 183.



the Humanist is concerned with consequences rather than with origins. He places no stock in intuition and denies the existence of innate ideas. Truth then is relative, objective, empirical, and pragmatic.

Regarding the attainment of knowledge, the scientific method is the means in which Humanism places its trust. Lamont, quoting from Thomas Huxley, describes this method as "nothing but trained and organized common sense."<sup>16</sup> He then proceeds to analyze it according to the five steps set forth by John Dewey: first, occurrence of a problem; second, analysis and clarification of the problem through observation and reflection; third, suggestion of working hypotheses; fourth, reasoning out of consequences or implications involved in each hypothesis; fifth, verification of the chosen solution. Lamont points out that, since many scientific hypotheses are not susceptible to final proof through direct observation, they require empirical verification of the logical and mathematical inferences which follow directly from the hypothesis. Any indirect method of verification requires inference from observed and proved facts. The entire process in the search for truth requires, at every step, sound observation, creative imagination, correct reasoning, and moral determination.

In stressing the importance of the scientific method

---

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 163



to the Humanist cause, Lamont has this to say:

Humanism believes that the greatest need of our age is the application, insofar as it is possible, of the method and spirit of science to all human problems and that the acquisition of this method and spirit constitutes a training of the mind far more important than the assimilation of any number of individual facts.... Human beings and human societies are much more complex than atoms or the solar system, and more subject to multiple causation. The most successful scientific experimentation demands both isolation of the problem and a rigid control over subject matter so far as the purposes of an experiment are concerned. Neither of these prerequisites is easy to obtain in the social sciences.<sup>17</sup>

The Humanist relates his concept of value directly to his theory of knowledge. In the words of Lamont:

Reason and scientific method are not in themselves enough to achieve a Humanist world.... Only in the service of generous and humane ends does it fulfil its highest possibilities.... Thus the constitution of the Phillips Exeter Academy reads: "Though goodness without knowledge ... is weak and feeble, yet knowledge without goodness is dangerous.... Both united form the noblest character and lay the surest foundation of usefulness to mankind."<sup>18</sup>

From the Humanist point of view, the supernatural First Cause or sustaining Principle or any concept of an Absolute is as irrelevant to ethics as it is to metaphysics or to science. No external source beyond experience is needed to prove things or actions as good: they are to be judged by their consequences for the individual and society. That is, the Humanist system of ethics is concerned not

---

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 175.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 188.



merely with the Pragmatic dictum of "workability," but also with the Instrumentalist question, "Does it promote human betterment and make life more worthwhile?" This viewpoint puts the decision of value-judgment on the plane of intelligence rather than entirely on results.

The relative nature of values is further proclaimed by Lamont in the following quotations:

There can be no immediate knowledge of the right. However, once we have established or accepted a regulative principle of morality, we are able to use it immediately thereafter.... The function of basic moral principles, expressing the funded wisdom of human experience, is not to provide absolute rules of conduct that will automatically tell men just what to do under all circumstances. Their function is to supply standpoints and methods which will enable the individual to make for himself an analysis of the elements of good and evil in the particular situation in which he finds himself. That analysis should always take into consideration the surrounding circumstances, the total context of a specific situation. Humanism teaches the formation of sound moral habits as well as of guiding moral principles, but believes that neither habits nor principles should grow too set or rigid.<sup>19</sup>

The culture of a people in any period of history has determined its particular ethical system.<sup>20</sup> This fact indicates a moral freedom which implies a moral responsibility to act on good motives, to use reason, and to adjust

---

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., pp. 193 - 195.

<sup>20</sup>Reiser, op. cit., p. 138. Professor Reiser envisages a world federation of friendly cultures: "In the past, morality has frequently been a matter of latitude, longitude, and even altitude; but in the future we need to adjust ourselves through techniques of international living expressing a universal morality."



means to ends.<sup>21</sup> The individual must impartially anticipate the total consequences of using any particular means, including any injurious effects on the desired end. Just as the Humanist metaphysics stressed a continuum of cause and effect, so its ethics maintains that there can be no artificial separation of means and ends, which also constitute a perpetual continuum of activity. Ultimately, ethical sanction does not rest solely on even highly developed intelligent self-interest but must involve the rendering of service to society. In the ideal situation, enlightened self-interest complements the social aim.

The educational implications of this ethical philosophy are significant. It becomes paramount that the individual be taught to reason correctly, beginning with difficulties rather than with premises. These difficulties will include the problem of resolving diverse desires into a working harmony. This process involves a realization that reason and emotions are complementary and not opposing forces, and that human nature is neither fundamentally good nor fundamentally bad. Motives and emotions must be trained so that the social and sympathetic tendencies of the individual will be encouraged. Social conditioning becomes a principle aim of ethical education, associating pleasure and happiness with doing right. Generally, to act as

---

<sup>21</sup>John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Modern Library, 1936), pp. 303 - 313.



intelligently as native capacity will permit must be shown to be a moral obligation.<sup>22</sup>

The Humanist's concept of reality and of knowledge also carry educational implications that are pertinent here. The principal means of attaining knowledge is through the application of reason and the scientific method to experience. In declaring that the human mind is not merely a passive reflector of the external world, the Humanist stresses the fundamental nature of initiative and creativity. The process of education must be one of doing, not solely one of receiving. Furthermore, the human mind does not merely react to actual stimulus, it reacts to the potentialities of the actual. Hence, a clear-cut cause-effect relationship in the educative process cannot be taken for granted -- the total situation must be considered. Man is a dynamic unity of body and mind, feeling and thought -- education must be concerned with the development of the whole man in a social environment.

---

<sup>22</sup>Oliver L. Reiser, Man's New Image of Man (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1961), pp. 119 - 120.

One answer to the important question of "What is mortality" is this: the good act (conduct) is that motivated by a good intention or attitude and leading to the best social consequences.... Our definition agrees with that proposed by Bertrand Russell: "The good life is the life inspired by love and guided by knowledge (intelligence).... We conclude that no specific act is itself, inherently and always, "good" or invariably "bad" -- it depends on the motives, circumstances, and consequences.... The ethics of a scientific Humanism places a premium on intelligence; in this respect it is opposed to an unintelligent morality which demands blind obedience to absolute commandments "from above." Man's highest duty includes the obligation to be as intelligent and well-informed as his biological heredity and social environment permit.



## CHAPTER III

A COMPARISON OF EARLIER HUMANISM AND THE MODERN  
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS REGARDING ART EDUCATION

Just as the Humanism of both ancient Greece and Renaissance Europe had emerged from a speculative rationalism and a solicing mysticism, so it finally reverted again to them. The failure of earlier Humanism to survive can be attributed to several reasons. First, its views were not completely and uncompromisingly humanistic. Standing in its way was a conventional dualism which the thought of the day was unable to discard.

Second, it lacked any ideal of cooperative success. In times of crises, man was prone to rely on the assistance of supernatural forces. In contrast, modern man is demanding help of ~~other~~ men in solving their mutual problems towards living a satisfying life. Lewis Mumford devoted his entire book Technics and Civilization to an expression of the complexity of modern life, its extension through science and its intensification through technics. He points out that the major issues of life today have far out-stripped the powers of individuals to cope with them successfully. He declares that modern civilization must master a new technic of cooperative thinking and action, or die.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup>Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1934).



Erasmus typified a third limitation of earlier Humanism. His narrow interests left him unconcerned with the new world opening before his eyes and actually set him opposed to scientific interests where they threatened to turn man's minds from the problems of morality. "The tragedy of Erasmus," says Humanist Randall, "was that in destroying old prejudices and overthrowing the mediaeval world, he had nothing to offer in its place. He lived too soon to see that to science belonged the future and without the sure support of science and its burning faith, the great quality of his attitude could not prevail.... When Voltaire took up the pen of Erasmus, he had what the humanism of the Renaissance never enjoyed, the mighty ally of science."<sup>24</sup>

A fourth reason for failure was as much concerned with the conditions of the times as with the Humanist ideology. To realize its fundamental purposes, Humanism needed to present to the people an organized expression of its views. The means of neither the ancient world nor the Renaissance could provide such an opportunity. In the ancient world, perverse indirection followed in the Sophist endeavor to teach success as a matter of gaining power of men over men. Humanism, on the other hand, is concerned with the cooperative endeavor of men over their

---

<sup>24</sup>John H. Randall, Jr., The Making of the Modern Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1940), p. 134.



environment. The Renaissance witnessed a similar excessive emphasis on individual success. The newly-invented printing press was used to give the world a Machiavellian slant towards competition rather than cooperation. The original ideals, embodying faith in human nature, in democracy, and in the improvement of institutions, fell by the way.<sup>25</sup>

The modern world too is certainly drifting. However, the vast expansion of education provides an unprecedented opportunity for the establishment of cultural patterns.<sup>26</sup> In both quantity and quality, education today presents a basis for a cultural advancement that should far exceed in extent and in impact any achievements of the outstanding epochs of the past. The hope of Erasmus is again alive; namely, that a Humanist society will invest in education and general cultural activity, sums proportionate to those

---

<sup>25</sup>Reese, op. cit., p. 4. "If Humanism fails to develop and clarify its basic attitudes and becomes a mere jumble of dissenting opinions, if it fails to become active in concrete human situations and merely observes social events from a detached position, if it fails to take seriously fundamental needs -- health and goods, romance and aesthetic experience -- and becomes another parlor movement, then it will die and it will deserve to do so. If, on the other hand, Humanism preserves its gains, makes significant additions in the light of modern knowledge, masters the techniques of personal and social adjustments, and actually plunges into the thick of the fight for a free and satisfying society, then it will live and it will deserve to do so."

<sup>26</sup>Lamont, op. cit., p. 228.



allocated to armaments and war. However, the great task must fall to the educational administrators to devise such programs that will ensure direction, free but forward-moving. The Humanist maintains that the educators must provide a freedom conducive to Humanistic thinking. They must not, however, indoctrinate -- at least not beyond those concepts already congenial to our culture, such as a faith in democracy, a belief in the inherent potentiality of human nature, and a hope for the betterment of social institutions.

A more universal agreement is needed regarding values intelligently selected on the basis of a broadened educational experience. This greater unanimity will make action more effective. A tactical campaign could bring people up to a level on which Humanism can provide the guiding principles of life. As J. K. Hart says:

The world changes, the world can be changed, but those who attempt to change it according to a plan must understand the inertias as well as the forces with which they have to make terms.... The way out of the drift of the times will be an educational one.... That education will face facts and issues. It will not hope by means of some tour de force or coup de grace to take the facts of life by surprise and to get them to surrender before they recover, but there will be a whole tactical campaign against the whole front of drift.<sup>27</sup>

It seems that there is need not only for a philosophy marked by a clarity of vision, but also a vehicle carrying it

---

<sup>27</sup>Joseph K. Hart, A Social Interpretation of Education (New York: H. Holt & Co., 1929), p. 164.



into actual practice. Modern Naturalistic Humanism purports to be such a philosophy, needing only a means of propagation.

The question arises as to whether or not art can play a greater part in the educative process. Lamont believes that as society becomes more Humanistic in its attitude, the importance of the artist is augmented:

The Humanist educational program will be a large factor in spreading a fundamental awareness of literature and art among all of the people. This does not mean any let-down in standards; on the contrary the effects will be just the opposite, by raising to unprecedented levels the average cultural understanding and by widening to an unprecedented extent the range of true artistic accomplishment on the part of both amateurs and professionals. The ideal in view is a society in which "the artist is not a special kind of man, but every man is a special kind of artist...." One of the challenges to Humanist writers and artists will be to embody in artistic and literary work the general point of view for which Humanism stands; to express in concepts and forms consonant with Humanist attitude that sense of the beauty and glory of life which Michelangelo, for instance, so superbly portrayed in the Sistine Chapel through the medium of a subject matter centred upon the supernatural. There is nothing in the nature of art, literature or poetry that makes treatment of the Christian myth lead to great creative accomplishment and that prevents a similar result in the representation of the humanistic and naturalistic world-view. Genius is not confined to the delineation of any one philosophic position concerning the universe and man.<sup>28</sup>

In fact, just as the art of those early periods of Humanistic thought reflected their fatal dualism, modern art has turned to the themes of today, such as heavy industrialization and the complexities of modern life. A brief look at

---

<sup>28</sup>Lamont, op. cit., pp. 229 - 230.



a unique feature of the development of Renaissance art should bring to focus problems germane to the present study.

Following the Middle Ages, graphic and plastic arts manifested a simultaneous and independent change in Northern and Southern Europe. That this parallel development is not so markedly shown in any other field is indicative of the sensitive reflection that art gives regarding the current thought of the day.

The Gothic tradition has been firmly established because it lent itself to a theological symbolism which represented the natural and the supernatural as one. Art adhered to this fundamental concept. However, with the advent of the fourteenth century, it reflected a new attitude to life. In the North, it turned to realism expressed in an attention to minute details of the material world: landscape settings, the interiors of houses, and personal adornments became interesting in themselves. Art began to express emotional reactions to the subject matter, more than spiritual reactions to the theme, even where that theme remained Christian. Art had become more concerned with the world of the senses than with the world of the spirit.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup>Francis H. Taylor, Fifty Centuries of Art (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 97. "The Stigmata" of Jan van Eycke (1380 - 1441) presents details of landscape (trees, distant sea and city) with a microscopic study of rock formations. This realism is in direct contrast to the symbolism of the mediaeval



The tendency towards realism was also evident in the South, where it manifested itself in a different way. The main concern there was not in an analytical study of human environment but in an anatomical study of the human figure. The process was enhanced by the discovery of modeling lights. The stimulating realism that evolved made the arbitrary contrasts of the more decorative Gothics seem bleak in comparison. George Rowley supports this view in his *Mary Tuttle Bourdon*.  
Lecture:

The first indication of the new age was the astounding advance in the realization of actuality. Masaccio (d. 1429) may not have been interested in things but he had the ability to visualize them in a new way since he was able to see nature in particular. For the first time since Roman days, an artist could render a living human figure. This vital quality was attained by Masaccio largely through his treatment of form. In contrast to the amorphous bulk of Giotto with a shoulder barely indicated here a knee there, Masaccio's figures are organic forms with living structural relationships between the parts.<sup>30</sup>

In essence these two movements in the art of Renaissance Europe were the same; namely, a turning of attention to an enjoyment of things of this world as seen through the eyes of the individual artist. Art was no longer a representation of religious beliefs alone, but an assertion of aesthetic perception. Besides the trend towards realism, art also reflected

---

"Stigmata" of Giotto (1266 - 1337). Rene Huyghe, *Art Treasures of the Louvre* (New York: Harry N. Abrams Co., 1951), p. 25.

<sup>30</sup>George Rowley et al, *The Civilization of the Renaissance* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 102.



the Renaissance change towards individualism. In contrast to the mass groupings of mediaeval art, the individual subject became an important study.<sup>31</sup> That is, the individual became more important than the group. The emphasis developed into an enthusiasm for portraiture. An exaggerated self-consciousness appeared in affected, artificial poses of "important" people. Art was catering to popular rather than to restricted, ecclesiastical demands. People of wealth, not of religion, had become the new connoisseurs of art.

In the Middle Ages, the fine arts had been the handmaidens of theology. They were not distinguished from the crafts. Both arts and crafts were bent on a common purpose: the creation of cathedrals for the greater glory of God. As the Renaissance approached, each art turned towards its own individual purpose. Architects planned elaborate palaces as well as churches. Sculptors created garden statues rather than altar pieces. Painters accepted commissions for portraits of the new connoisseurs rather than for pictures of the saints. Each had nothing to do with the design of the other. The

---

<sup>31</sup>Rene Huyghe, Art Treasures of the Louvre (New York: Harry N. Abrams Co., 1951), pp. 25, 27. For typical mediaeval art in this connection, see (a) Cimabue (1240 - 1302): "Madonna of the Angels" (Florentine School) (b) Martinie (1285 - 1344): "Christ Carrying the Cross" (Sienese School).  
Ibid., p. 29 and frontispiece. For typical Renaissance art in contrast, see (a) Pisanello (1395 - 1455): "A Princess of the Este Family" (Northern Italian School) (b) Matsys (1465 - 1530): "The Moneylender and His Wife" (Flemish School).



separation of the various arts was effected, and their separation from the church was a trend. As a result, the artist was freed to adapt his media to the particular subject-matter of his choice, using whatever techniques his genius could devise. Some artists painted in satiric attack on the evils of the day. Albert Durer's "Apocalypse" (1498) was directed against clerical corruption. Like Erasmus, Durer did not break with the church, because he believed that abuses could be destroyed without causing harmful disunity.<sup>32</sup>

These changes in art expression were distinctly Renaissance reactions to a way of thought and life. They cannot be misconstrued as merely reactions to a form of art. On the contrary, the Italian schools remained faithful to their classical traditions, and the Northern schools remained equally true to their Gothic traditions, wherever these principles did not interfere with the expression of the new humanistic attitude. For instance, the art of the North retained the multiple vanishing points, the swinging lines, and the static forms. "The Gothic modes of expression," writes Rowley, "were so much the artistic language of the North that even where the new spirit appeared, it had to tell its tale in the traditional Gothic phrases."<sup>33</sup>

---

<sup>32</sup>Sidney Dark, The Story of the Renaissance (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1924), p. 225.

<sup>33</sup>Rowley, op. cit., p. 111.



It was significant that Humanism had found expression in the art of the Renaissance, in terms of man and his earthly life. Here was an awareness of the individual, an admiration for nature, a concern for material possessions, the emergence of the artist as a creating personality, and a realization of a new freedom in expression.

Despite their similarities, Italian and Northern art graphically presented two distinct directions of the Humanist theme. The works of two artists epitomized the achievement of Renaissance art and represented the two extremes. Both Michelangelo and Breughel the Elder were keenly alive to the problems of life conceived in Humanistic terms. Michelangelo was concerned with human destiny. Breughel, who viewed humanity with the simplicity and directness of a peasant, was concerned with the vicissitudes of everyday life. Whatever the point of view, the theme of the Renaissance was "man" -- in the South his glorification, in the North his acceptance as a human being with all the joys and sorrows, failures and successes of this life.

A multiplicity of causes brought on the regression from Humanism following the Renaissance. But, since that time, no single central theme has again achieved the hold on art that Mediaeval Christianity once enjoyed. That art itself failed to retain its influence may be due not so much to the fact that it refused to confine its subject matter, as to the



fact that it required an educational leadership. In all the great tracts on education which came out of that era, none were concerned with the place of art in the curriculum. What Erasmus and others set out for the study of language as to methodology, objectives, and educational philosophy, was not so much as suggested for art. The parallel with today's situation is evident. It is consistent with Humanist thinking to say that a sound aesthetic philosophy, in keeping with the thinking of the times, is necessary to prevent a falling away from high standards in art.

Awareness of other parallels between the Renaissance and the modern situation may prove of value to those interested in art education today. They must realize the existence of popular pressures reflecting themselves in contemporary art. They must beware of the development of harmful self-consciousness in modern art. They must ask the question, "Who are to be the connoisseurs of art, dictating what art should be?" But they can do more: they can provide an education that will permit aesthetic rather than economic or religious interests to determine the standards to be achieved in a growing Western culture.

May not an effective education program in art, backed by a sound philosophy, help to answer such difficulties as those mentioned? Should not one of the main objectives be to create an enlightened public, capable of appreciating the new



art as well as the old? The common consensus of opinion today seems to be that the aim of instruction in art certainly should not be exclusively the development of technical skills. Nor are the "new artists" to be taught to paint as the Humanist thinks he should paint. In fact, because any art (graphic or literary) may be an expression of current ideas, and because great art is a record of the highest ideals or the most profound ideas of the ages, it is imperative that the artist enjoy freedom of expression. Lamont advances this argument very clearly:

The Humanist stress on complete cultural democracy and freedom of expression means that artists and writers should have the widest latitude in what they produce and say. A free art and a free literature are absolutely essential for a free culture. A Humanist civilization will contain many different and contradictory currents of thought, including non-Humanist and anti-Humanist tendencies. It certainly will not bring pressure on art and literature to conform to any official philosophy: or seek to force the novel, the theatre and the motion picture to deal with Humanist themes. Artists and writers in a Humanist culture will express what they believe and believe what they express.<sup>34</sup>

Before a Humanist aesthetic philosophy can be set forth, it must be made clear that art has a two-fold function. It is utilitarian in that it is a means of communication between the artist and the observer; it is aesthetic in that it provides satisfaction to an aesthetic sense. The Humanist would say that an adequate education in art must be concerned with both of these functions.

---

<sup>34</sup>Lamont, op. cit., p. 228.



## CHAPTER IV

## A HUMANIST AESTHETIC PHILOSOPHY

A Humanist critique of the nature and purpose of other philosophical pursuits helps to determine the nature of the aesthetic function of art. It is only of etymological interest to the Humanist that "philosophy" has been defined as "the love of wisdom". Although this attitude may be the motivation of the philosopher's enterprise, it is no definition of the pursuit. According to the Humanist, philosophy is not only a criticism of scientific knowledge, but it is also a comprehensive interpretation of all knowledge itself on the basis of experience and reason. It is, in short, a process of making sense out of experience.

This process may include, for example, a clarification of the meaning and significance of problems as well as an analysis of our knowledge. It is not, however, merely a creative activity. It can explain the facts or the order of facts, the existence of which are asserted by science; but it cannot in itself assert the existence of facts of its own making. Reason, intent upon the facts of experience, essentially characterize the pursuit of philosophy.

Different types of reasoning and experience constitute the basis of the different branches of philosophy. They are genuine provinces of rational activity involving a synthesis



of ordering, correlating, and evaluating facts of experience. In the words of Lamont,

Philosophy as synthesis attempts to work out a correct and integrated view of the universe, of human nature, of society, and of the chief values man should seek. It was Plato's ambitious claim that 'the philosopher is the spectator of all time and all existence.' This statement is true, though I hasten to add that the philosopher cannot afford to be merely a spectator. Plato's observation makes plain that the philosophic enterprise covers, in its own particular way, practically the whole gamut of human thought and activity. In order to attain a reasoned interpretation of Nature and man, the philosopher must inquire into the major branches of the natural sciences, such as chemistry, astronomy and biology, and likewise of the social sciences, such as history, economics and politics. Moreover, he must study carefully the realms of religion and art and literature; and cast a discerning eye over the day-to-day preoccupations and common-sense attitudes of the average person.<sup>35</sup>

In this schemata of philosophic thought, aesthetics has a vital place for the Humanist, who places particular emphasis on making human life both purposeful and enjoyable. The examination of the nature of science itself, of the nature of scientific knowledge, and of the process by which such knowledge is obtained and verified, becomes the concern of philosophy in its epistemological sense. The study of the nature and principles of human conduct becomes the concern of the philosophy of ethics. The investigation of those human experiences involving the pleasurable activity of the contemplation of the beautiful in art and in nature becomes the concern of the aesthetic aspect of philosophy.

---

<sup>35</sup>Lamont, op. cit., p. 2.



Naturalistic Humanism maintains that, whatever the branch of philosophy, the proper avenue of approach is through reason and experience. When the attempt is made to arrive at an understanding of existence through insight, intuition, or some other non-rational channel, this adventure of the human spirit becomes a mystical one and ceases to be philosophical.<sup>36</sup> Ultimately, philosophy stands and falls by its reference to facts of experience with which it is logically reconciled.

The Humanist's position regarding the so-called "speculative philosophies" is particularly significant because he finds in them an activity akin to the aesthetic.

This pursuit of system-making and universe-building has herring-boned the history of philosophy with digressions. It does not generally start with the conclusions of science, but rather employs reason in vacuo, describing the universe purely out of the tenets of rationality. Such a system as the Cartesian metaphysical dualism which hypostasized two ultimate substances, mind and matter, provided satisfaction to this type of speculative philosopher.

Some, on the other hand, did take the data of experience as the starting point not for the purpose of vindicating them, but for that of providing a point of departure for speculation. It then laid down some criterion

---

<sup>36</sup>Lamont, op. cit., pp. 160 - 161.



of rationality as the condition that had to be satisfied by the universe that really exists. The modern movement in Idealistic Metaphysics, for instance, was inspired by the work of Kant. As B. A. G. Fuller points out:

It needed, then, but a step to dramatize the epistemological Frankenstein created by Kant into a sort of metaphysical Childe Harold or Don Juan reciting to himself in a monologue of his own composition the pilgrimage and the adventures of the world-process.... Now, however, a line of metaphysical thinking arose which was to regard the universe as the autobiography of an Absolute Self.... Considerations like these might well lead to another outburst of creative speculation. Metaphysics, upon the validity of which Locke and Hume and Kant had all cast such grave doubts, came into its own again. The limitations they had laid upon the mind's power to deal with Reality were removed, and by another of those curious ironies, of which the history of philosophy is full, the "self, whose very existence had been challenged by Locke and Hume, and whose nature had been declared unknowable by Kant, was made the substance of all things.<sup>37</sup>

The influence of this type of speculative thinking reached its heights in the Hegelian construction of a system of Absolute Idealism and in the monadology of Leibnitz. The Naturalistic Humanist maintains that, since these hypotheses cannot be verified and cannot claim to be true, their only merit lies in their internal rationality or freedom from self-contradiction; that is, in their structural unity.

The Humanist, on the other hand, is more concerned with the many unities perceptible through experience. That is, he is concerned with knowable reality. Lamont aptly presents

---

<sup>37</sup>B. A. G. Fuller, A History of Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1938), p. 358.



the Humanist's position:

One of the chief motives in the philosophic tendency to set up a supernatural sphere of influence in addition to Nature itself has been the endeavor to escape from the constant change, precariousness and impermanence of the world around us.... Another mistake that system-building philosophers, especially those of the Idealist school, have made is to assign to the universe a fictitious unity. The great Cosmic Mind of Idealism binds together the entire universe in a unified totality, an all-encompassing monism. Humanism rejects this conception. We speak loosely of the universe to designate the whole of reality; but when we come to analyze the matter closely, we find that the infinitely diverse world of Nature is a many rather than a one, a multi-verse rather than a uni-verse.... There are partial unities, to be sure, but no one, vast, over-arching unity.<sup>38</sup>

The point which the Humanist makes is that Idealism is par excellence a universe-building, reality-creating enterprise which fails to be a genuine philosophical theory. Although it alleges to discuss the nature of things and to establish reality, it is not concerned with reality as we know it. It supplies factors or forces to unify the irreconcilable diversity of observed phenomena, to rationalize and hence to dissolve the discrepancy between the one and the many. In other words, to compensate for inadequacy in scientific knowledge regarding experience, the idealist departs entirely from reflection on experience so that he may satisfy an innate desire for unification.

Modern Humanism recognizes this desire as a phenomenon of human nature. Had it been so recognized by the early

---

<sup>38</sup>Lamont, op. cit., p. 128.



Humanists, they may not have been lured back into a speculative rationalism and mysticism. Today the Humanist is on his guard realizing that man has always sought to ascribe to nature something more than what appears on the surface. He ascribes these attributes in order to make understanding possible in the face of an enormous bulk of ordinary experience which finds no place in his total scheme of things.

A Humanist philosophy seeks to clarify genuine problems of life and to ascertain basic values in order that tactics and techniques may be devised to solve these problems and to establish these values. In pointing out that the modern world needs a new conception of values in line with Humanistic thinking, Herbert Read says, "What I seek, and what surely we all seek, is a coherent conception of human existence, and an affirmation, as firm as the empirical facts will allow, of any values that give significance to our daily activities."<sup>39</sup>

Speculative and mystic philosophies, on the other hand, are expressions of man's desires. They are reflections of his life as he views it rationalistically. The Humanist views them as huge structures of mental delight, which resolve no problems and determine no genuine values. They may, however, fortuitously provide the imaginative element which is instrumental in stimulating efforts toward the solution of problems.

---

<sup>39</sup>Herbert Read, The Forms of Things Unknown (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1958), p. 175.



but the solution comes through eventual experimentation and manipulation of facts of experience. That is, speculative philosophy does what any artistic creation may do in making life meaningful, rich, and forward-moving. Dewey points out a link between aesthetic and scientific activity:

Since the artist cares in a peculiar way for the phase of experience in which union is achieved, he does not shun moments of resistance and tension. He rather cultivates them, not for their own sake but because of their potentialities, bringing to living consciousness and experience that is unified and total. In contrast with the person whose purpose is aesthetic, the scientific man is interested in problems, in situations wherein tension between the matter of observation and of thought are marked. Of course he cares for their resolution. But he does not rest in it; he passes on to another problem using an attained solution only as a stepping stone from which to set on foot further inquiries.<sup>40</sup>

As one of the Naturalistic Humanists of our times, Dewey underlines the importance of the desire for unification in Aesthetic vision. Indeed, the modern Humanist maintains that philosophy has its very roots in human life, including a multiplicity of inclinations and desires. He also contends that, if rationalistic speculation (following the desire for unification) had been recognized as aesthetic expression for the delight of the human mind, the purpose of these activities may have found greater fruition. Following the Middle Ages, they also required a greater freedom to make use of the newly-found richness of life. The theme of Renaissance art had

---

<sup>40</sup>John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1934), p. 15.



masterful expression, and the theme in its greatest paintings was more humanistic than was supposed and, generally, more humanistic than other-worldly. For instance, in many a "Crucifixion", it was not the "promise of salvation," but the tortured grief of motherhood over the loss of an illustrious son, that gave the painting significance. Finally, however, Renaissance art wore itself out in adherence to forced principles and limited subject matter. In the words of Roger Fry:

The Catholic reaction retarded and impeded the main movement of Renaissance thought but it did not really succeed either in suppressing it or changing the main direction of its current. In Art it undoubtedly had some direct effect, it created a new kind of insincerity of expression, a florid and sentimental religiosity -- a new variety of bad taste, the rhetorical and over-emphatic. And I suspect that art was already prepared for this step by a certain exhaustion of the impulsive energy of the Renaissance....<sup>41</sup>

Evidently, in order to flourish, neither art nor philosophy could be denied the freedom to concern itself with the whole of human life. On freedom of expression, Lamont has this to say:

In my judgment, civil libertarians have stressed too much the undoubted fact that freedom of expression is the best way for men to arrive at the truth. But the justification for free speech goes deeper than that: for the realm of significant meaning and cultural creativity is far wider than the realm of truth. Novels, poetry and art do not need to be true in a factual or scientific sense; the human imagination cannot permit itself to be fettered by fact. Most important of all is that human thought at all levels is bound up by language

---

<sup>41</sup>Roger Fry, Vision and Design (Cambridge, Mass.: Murray Printing Co., 1947), p. 4.



and communication, which is necessary for men's intellectual development and training in the use of reason.<sup>42</sup>

Underlining this point made by Lamont are the following words from Reese: "The progress of mankind can be measured in terms of the extension of the liberty of persons."<sup>43</sup> These references point up the fact that Humanism places stress on freedom of expression, not so much as a human right, but as a necessity for the individual in order that mankind may progress.

In this air of pure freedom, the Humanist sees the responsibility to maintain a perspective that does not lose sight of reality, to realize the aesthetic nature of speculative thought, and to recognize the distinction between the artistic symbol and the objective reality.

In ancient Greece there was something of the proper perspective. Gilbert Murray makes a pertinent comment on the artistic representation of the Greek gods:

The Gods could awaken a man's worship and strengthen his higher aspirations, but at heart he knew them to be only metaphors. As the most beautiful image carved by man was not the god, but only a symbol to help towards conceiving the god, so the god himself, when conceived, was not the reality but only the symbol to help towards conceiving the reality. That was the work set before them. Meanwhile they issued no creeds that contradicted knowledge, no commands that made man sin against his own inner light.<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup>Lamont, op. cit., p. 221.

<sup>43</sup>Curtis Reese, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>44</sup>Gilbert Murray, The Five Stages of Greek Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), pp. 100 - 101.



Greek art carried significance by its symbols, and the concepts and the symbols were not confused. Pattern, treatment, and technique conformed to the needs of significant aesthetic communication and an aesthetic urge for unification.

Although political change had much to do with the fate of Greek art and philosophy, basically the fall was characterized by an inclination toward purely speculative philosophy and mysticism, divorced from practical considerations of reality. The symbols of expression became confused with the realities they represented. Will Durant relates an interesting incident which points up this feature of the decline of Greece:

Alexander himself, in the hour of his triumph, was conquered by the soul of the East.... He introduced into Europe the Oriental notion of the divine right of kings; and at last he astonished a sceptic Greece by announcing, in magnificent Eastern style, that he was a god. Greece laughed; and Alexander drank himself to death. This subtle infusion of an Asiatic soul into the wearied body of the master Greek was followed rapidly by the pouring of Oriental cults and faiths into Greece.... The mystic and superstitious faiths which had taken root among the poorer people of Hellas were reinforced and spread about; and the Oriental spirit of apathy and resignation found a ready soil in decadent Greece.<sup>45</sup>

The foregoing review of the decline of these great early Humanistic eras illustrates certain aspects of speculative philosophy, including its association with

---

<sup>45</sup>Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (New York: Garden City Publishing Co., 1943), p. 75.



aesthetics. In going too far, it removes the significance which its creative vision held. In divorcing itself from reality, it renders its insights useless. However, speculative philosophy is not circumscribed by the limitations enforced by the senses on our experience. Therefore, restrained by common sense, it is a poetic expression which may possess insight into those phases of the reality of nature which an experiential approach cannot reach. Such philosophies are aesthetic creations which can be visions of reality in which both reason and intuition are means to an end. In the words of George Santayana:

They terminate in insight, or what in the noblest sense of the word may be called 'theory', a steady contemplation of all things in their order and worth. Such contemplation is imaginative. No one can reach it who has not enlarged his mind and tamed his heart. A philosopher who attains it is, for the moment, a poet; and a poet who turns his practised and passionate imagination on the order of all things, or on anything in the light of the whole, is for that moment a philosopher.<sup>46</sup>

The analysis of speculative thought serves two main purposes. First, it emphasizes the Humanist's conception of the nature of philosophy as being concerned primarily with experience. Secondly, it reveals that the drive for unification is the basis of Humanist aesthetics rather than a contradiction of it. That is, the factor responsible for

---

<sup>46</sup>George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1945), p. 11.



the speculative activity of reason is the same as that responsible for artistic creation: the mind is impelled to seek -- and to create if it cannot find -- significance in its world as a whole. In order to express relationships within experience, it looks for this significance in terms of concepts originally formed.

Although this process at times involves the building of unwarranted structures on originally useful and meaningful knowledge, it need not be harmful. In fact, as long as we are aware of its being no more than the mind's impulse toward the creation of forms in which the imagination can rest and a feeling of significance can be enjoyed, it becomes an essential factor giving depth to human experience.

In art, the structural aspects of a masterpiece is responsible for arousing our interest. When we see a work of art, we experience a unique feeling and call it an aesthetic experience. It is not just pleasure or delight or approbation, but it is constituted by a peculiarly subjective psychological state. Dewey, realizing the difficulty of defining aesthetic feeling, is inclined to identify it with "delight". He says,

The live being recurrently loses and reestablishes his equilibrium with his surroundings. The moment of passage from disturbance into harmony is that of intensest life.... Pleasure may come about through chance contact and stimulation; but happiness and delight are a different thing. They come to be through a fulfillment that reaches to the depth of our being -- one that



is an adjustment of our whole being with the conditions of existence.<sup>47</sup>

It is not only in the realm of graphic art that this phenomenon is exhibited. An analogy may be found in music. A listener's interest on hearing the unfolding of a melody lies in the very structure of that melody. If, for instance, as the melody comes to its concluding stage, its progression is slowed down by a prolonged penultimate note, one's attention and interest at that moment becomes greatly heightened. It receives a striking satisfaction when the last note is heard, bringing the melody to a natural anticipated close. The structure of the melody is more or less discerned when the penultimate note is struck. This aroused-anticipation of the possibilities of the completion of the structure acutely stimulates the listener's interest. The hearing of an anticipated note gratifies his interest. Had the last note been one of discord with the melody, he would have felt aesthetic disgust at the violation of the structure. This analysis applies all the more acutely to the appreciation of a familiar piece of music, wherein each note in succession takes its place in the reminiscent pattern.

The analogy found in music serves to point out the type of anticipation for unified pattern which is experienced

---

<sup>47</sup>Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 17.



in the graphic arts. The right stroke of the brush, the exact drawing of a line, or the correct placement of a figure in a spatial relation (as compared to a temporal relation in music) gratifies the viewer's aesthetic interest. If the wrong element enters, whether it be of line, space, color, shape, texture or tone, he knows it is discordant, even though he may not be able himself to supply the correct one. Dr. Denman Ross of Harvard University sums up this point in his formula "that a composition is of value in proportion to the number of orderly connections which it displays."<sup>48</sup>

The conclusion that emerges from these illustrations is that one's interest in a work of art is aroused in an expectation or anticipation of fulfilment. Pattern then becomes a standard to which a work of art must comply, and satisfaction is understandable in terms of the human urge for unification. The spectator must be an active participant but the prime duty of an artist is to give at least a suggestion of pattern or structure which is not too obscure; otherwise, no artistic appreciation can possibly result.

This view is clearly substantiated by observations made by Dewey:

To perceive, a beholder must create his own experience. And his creation must include relations comparable

---

<sup>48</sup>Fry, op. cit., p. 21.



to those which the original producer underwent. They are not the same in any literal sense. But with the perceiver, as with the artist, there must be an ordering of the elements of the whole that is in form, although not in details, the same as the process of organization the creator of the work consciously experienced. Without an act of re-creation, the object is not perceived as a work of art. The artist selected, simplified, clarified, abridged and condensed according to his interest. The beholder must go through these operations according to his point of view and interest. In both, an act of abstraction, that is of extraction of what is significant, takes place. In both, there is, a gathering together of details and particulars physically scattered into an experienced whole. There is work done on the part of the percipient as there is on the part of the artist. The one who is too lazy, idle, or indurate in convention to perform this work will not see or hear. His 'appreciation' will be a mixture of scraps of learning with conformity to norms of conventional admiration and with a confused, even if genuine, emotional excitement.<sup>49</sup>

In much modern amateur art and music, even the sophisticated and allegedly initiated spectator must spare no pains in extracting a scheme or structure to admire. Frequently the structure is so hidden that it precludes any effect of an anticipated aesthetic whole. Even the detailed analysis which it demands may not provide genuine aesthetic gratification. When the spectator has found some structural unity, it is frequently not implied by the piece of art of this type, but is the creation in the mind of the spectator. The refuge of these artists, when they have been criticized for creating an aesthetic absurdity, is the doubtful

---

<sup>49</sup>Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 54.



defense afforded by their slogan that "all art is subjective". This position, it shall be seen later, the Humanist cannot accept.



## CHAPTER V

## THE CREATIVE PROCESS AND ITS RELATION TO VALUES

Much of the modern activity in the art field tends to promote a belief that art is esoteric. The Humanist deplores this inference. He is concerned with the full utilization of natural and created means of the enjoyment of life. This must include not only linguistic modes of communication, but also those artistic or non-verbal modes which express concepts, emotions, and sensory perceptions beyond the reach of linguistic signs. Such modes of communication are not esoteric, although their characteristics may vary between geographical areas and historical areas as do racial tongues.

Nor is the Humanist concerned merely with "enjoyment" in the usual sense. The ultimate which he seeks is the development of individual capacities to an extent that will make possible an awareness of all that life is. He believes in the need to exploit the aesthetic richness of the world to the utmost in the realization of this full life. Regarding the process of art, he takes an attitude encouraging those artistic pursuits to promote the deepest as well as the broadest appreciation of natural phenomena.

To the Humanist, graphic art has manifold purposes just as lyric poetry has. Corresponding to these purposes,



there are varying forms. Each may communicate an idea that cannot be expressed as effectively in another art form. In general, art symbols, in a significant structural relationship, are better employed in the representation of feelings which cannot be relayed through the signs known to language. The true worth of an aesthetic creation is not to be gauged by its mimic correspondence to experience. Its value consists, rather, in the coordination of psycho-sensory effects which form a pattern in experience -- a pattern not immediately recognizable. This artistic creation is associated with human ideals and emotions, or it expresses certain aspects of life which the artist wishes to bring to the fore.

It is now generally accepted that the artistic process is one of creation, not imitation. That is, the primary purpose of design is symbolism, not representation. The fighting bulls of an Altamira prehistoric cave drawing, or of an early Egyptian painting, or of a 19th century Goya oil composition all show that this view is no modern innovation. Each clearly exhibits three types of symbolism. The bull itself is symbolic rather than presented in a photographic likeness. Certain elements of these designs spontaneously symbolize qualities associated with this subject. Each design in its totality symbolizes feelings or emotional attitudes which its artist wished to communicate, varying in the three pictures from awe to admiration to fear.



The artist, in his creation of design, uses symbols to communicate meaning. The sensory objects which originally stimulated his efforts are not the symbolic forms of the work of art. These forms are created in the process of simplification, exaggeration, and unification. That is, the reality presented in a work of art is not the reality which formed the original sensory-stimulus. In fact, as Read explains, over-indulgence in sensation can hinder visual conception: "For example, in sensing the beauty of a particular object, we may occupy ourselves with this sensation entirely, without proceeding a single step towards the perceptual mastering of the object."<sup>50</sup> Read is actually echoing the views of Langer:

An artistically sensitive mind sees significant form where such form presents itself. The profusion of natural models undoubtedly is responsible for the early development of plastic art. But there is a danger in that asset, too; for the purely visual arts very easily become model-bound. Instead of merely providing artistic ideas, a model may dictate to the artist; its practical functions, which served to organize the conception of it as a form, may claim his attention to the detriment of his abstractive vision. Its interest as an object may conflict with his pictorial interest and confuse the purpose of his work.<sup>51</sup>

In graphic art as in literary art, the connotative meaning achieved through certain combinations is more

---

<sup>50</sup>Read, op. cit., p. 39.

<sup>51</sup>Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1948), p. 211.



significant than the denotative meaning of the individual signs or symbols used. The artistic process, then, involves the presentation to consciousness of certain concrete objects, shapes, colors, and the like which appeal to sensations. The purpose of this created stimulus is to present to consciousness the related or implied feelings, attitudes, or ideas which the artist wishes to communicate.

The question then arises as to the need of graphic arts as a mode of communication when there are linguistic forms. Read presents the answer in a succinct comment which points out that art is a cognitive activity which is not merely a substitute for linguistic types of discourse: "It is a unique mode of discourse giving access to areas of knowledge that are closed to other types of discourse."<sup>52</sup> Read is reiterating what Shakespeare said over three hundred years ago; namely, that the arts use their symbols to create a new reality or to bring to the level of perception features of reality for which prosaic language has devised no adequate communicative signs:

The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,  
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;  
And as imagination bodies forth  
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen  
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing  
A local habitation and a name.<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup>Read, op. cit., p. 37.

<sup>53</sup>William Shakespeare, A Midsummer-Night's Dream, Act V, Sc.i, Lines 12 - 17.



A comment made by a student in an Edmonton high school illustrates the same point. Asked to state in his own words a poet's message, he objected, saying that not he nor anyone could do so because prose was inadequate, that the poet had turned to verse to express what could not be communicated in any other way, and that there was meaning in the totality of the selection which any dissection would mutilate.

Langer, in more philosophical terms, presents the same idea regarding expression through the graphic arts: "The limits of language are not the last limits of experience, and things inaccessible to language may have their own forms of conception, that is to say, their own symbolic devices.... Artistic expression is the verbally ineffable, yet not inexpressible law of vital experience...."<sup>54</sup>

In this process of non-linguistic expression in response to the physical world, the urge for unification is also the power enabling man to venture into a new field of insight. Langer clearly substantiates the view that such an inherent biological necessity is involved in an aesthetic organization of sense perceptions:

Our merest sense-experience is a process of formulation. The world that actually meets our senses is not a world of "things," about which we are invited to

---

<sup>54</sup>Read, op. cit., p. 42.



discover facts as soon as we have codified the necessary logical language to do so; the world of pure sensation is so complex, so fluid and full, that sheer sensitivity to stimuli would only encounter what William James has called (in characteristic phrase) "a blooming, buzzing confusion." Out of this bedlam our sense-organs must select certain predominant forms, if they are to make report of things and not of mere dissolving sensa.... An object is not a datum, but a form construed by the sensitive and intelligent organ, a form which is at once an experienced individual thing and a symbol for the concept of it, for this sort of thing.

A tendency to organize the sensory field into groups and patterns of sense-data, to perceive forms rather than a flux of light-impressions, seems to be inherent in our receptor apparatus just as much as in the higher nervous centers with which we do arithmetic and logic.<sup>55</sup>

The human emotions, which impel artistic creation, are also subjected to unification in the process. Just as the symbolic forms of the product are not necessarily representations of the forms of reality which stimulated the creative process, so the complex of emotional experience is also simplified and intensified. In his emotionalist theory of aesthetics presenting art as the "reliever," Yrjö Hirn has this to say:

However earnestly an artist may strive to communicate to his public the exact feeling he has himself experienced, the emotional content expressed in his work will always be of another and more harmonious character than the mental state by which his production was originally called into existence. To the extent that artistic form appears in a given work of manifestation there will also be present, independently of the subject -- cheerful or sad, passionate or calm -- a sense of

---

<sup>55</sup>Langer, op. cit., p. 83.



mental liberation, which atones for the excesses of emotional excitement.<sup>56</sup>

It is in keeping with this belief that all great artists, literary or graphic, have practised that principle which our textbooks label as "restraint".

The tendencies which make us seek pattern, whether emotional restraint, visual design, or intellectual concept, or to expect fulfilment of an ordered nature on contemplation of a work of art, appear to be manifestations of the same basic urge. The desire to order and to correlate the data of experience, to rationalize and to unify them in science and philosophy, shows the pervasiveness of this innate drive in activities other than the purely aesthetic. In a way which augments this view, Dewey defines art, not so much as the creation of forms per se, as the selection, simplification, exaggeration, and organization of forms so as to make perceptual experience more significant, more emphatic, and more enduring. He goes on to say:

It is not by accident that some objects and situations afford marked perceptual satisfactions; they do so because of their structural properties and relations. An artist may work with a minimum of analytic recognition of these structures or 'forms'; he may select them chiefly by a kind of sympathetic vibration. But they may also be discriminatively ascertained; and an artist may utilize his deliberate awareness of them to create works of art that are more formal and abstract than

---

<sup>56</sup>Yrjo Hirn, The Origins of Art (New York: MacMillan Co., 1900), p. 105.



those to which the public is accustomed. Tendency to composition in terms of the formal characters marks much contemporary art, in poetry, painting, music, even sculpture and architecture. At their worst, these products are 'scientific' rather than artistic: technical exercises, sterile and of a new kind of pedantry. At their best, they assist in ushering in new modes of art; and by education of the organs of perception in new modes of consummatory objects, they enlarge and enrich the world of human vision.<sup>57</sup>

The hope for this type of design-for-design-sake art to which Dewey refers, does not rest in the possibility of its ever being able to stand alone as art. It does present the possibility of new art forms being developed from it by artists who will make its pattern significant by adaptation of the visual with the intellectual and emotional elements in order to produce a single aesthetic effect.

In defining the nature of the creative process, it is not enough to say that it is evoked by a desire for unification of sensory, emotional, and intellectual responses to the environment. Nor that it is executed through symbolism which goes beyond the discursive. Nor that its field is unlimited both in breadth of vision and depth of insight. To leave the definition so would suggest that it is a diffusion of forces let loose in a futile effort to achieve unification. The process must be directed by a system of values.

---

<sup>57</sup>John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1926), p. 391.



A popular misconception would lead one to believe that the artist turns through failure and frustration to seek beauty and order in his environment or harmony in the influences which affect his life. It suggests that, as a compensation for privations, he satisfies his craving for order and beauty by artistic creation of ideals. On the contrary, the artist (including the speculative philosopher) is more keenly sensitive to the possibilities of patterned relationships. To the humbler, untrained mind, these associations are unknown or are meaningless perceptions. Through the trained mind of the artist, they become accentuated in his creations. Three particular factors become involved in directing the artistic process: first, the insufficiency of the pattern of things as conceived by the general public; second, the artist's anticipation of the completion of a form in a creative design or the striking of a "penultimate note"; and third, the culmination of these factors in satisfaction for both the artist and the viewer.

The Humanist system of aesthetic value rests on the basis of the satisfaction of worthy human desires or needs. The question then arises as to what desires are to be considered worthy. In accordance with the traits of Humanism presented in Chapter II, the general criterion would be the fullest realization of human capacity. The portrayal of negative aspects of life will have value too, if it



assists rather than detracts from this development. The system involves a relativity of values realized through experience.

The Humanist concept of the relativity of values is based on a view of reality as a construction of processes alterable by human means for human needs. Whatever unity of structure or pattern there may be in the interrelationship of motion and matter, the combination of activities is becoming increasingly alterable through human devices. Without the exercise of human wisdom, "the new" is in a constant process of "becoming"; but geographical and temporal fortune as well as fitness determines evolutionary outgrowths in the natural state which produces novelty but not necessarily improvement.

The Humanist maintains that something different from and better than the original, undirected natural sequence can be achieved by conscious, purposeful study, planning, and action. The problem involves guarding against certain trends of the times which may be harmful regressions rather than genuine human achievements. With the intervention of human reason, evolution comes nearer to being synonymous with progressive development. With this advancement occurs an inevitable change in values.

This readjustment of values is not mere whimsical shift in opinion but a change in judgments as to the



adequacy of man-directed natural processes to contribute to the satisfaction of human needs. With new discoveries of such "adequate means," man generally attributes values as inherent properties of things which may be the object of satisfaction. He holds tenaciously to this belief in a connection between qualities and things. Only after decades of error does he fasten his faith on new values. He may be in error, but at least he exhibits that characteristic of values which shows them to be determined by man, to be relative to the expediency with which situations satisfy desire. Things are not good or evil in themselves but only in the effect of their relationships in the achievement of goals.

Value, then, consists in an active process which answers as adequately to human needs as human reason can divine. Desire is the original element of value. If the attribute of desire were not there, value would not have that clarity of direction which causes men to designate value as belonging to things. For desire has tension which demands the institution of a process toward its satisfaction. Aesthetic values are attributes to any device or technique which is characterized by efficacy in the creative process. Any art form has some value if it is an effective element in communication. The degree of value will depend on the degree to which the communication adds to the enrichment



of life, not merely to the gratification of sensuous pleasure.



## CHAPTER VI

## CONCEPTS FUNDAMENTAL TO HUMANISTIC AESTHETICS

The shifting of values was bound to affect the art manifestations of each period of history. Indeed, there have been recurrent forces of various types characterizing the art of each period. For instance, ever since Lessing in the "Laokoon" (1785) raised the question of the philosophical analysis of "art as the expression of the human spirit," many writers have tried to attribute these recurrent forces to prevailing social influences. However, the variations have proven through the ages to be merely ephemeral attributes. There must remain an element which is common to all that can be called by the name of "Art".

The Humanist seeks for this invariable residuum in art as a function of human appreciation independent of the temper of the age. Through this inquiry he hopes not only to determine what touches the chords of the human psyche, but also to make more intelligible the effects that artistic expression may create. For, just as the type of art is moulded by the temper of its times, that same art also remolds human ideals into a newer pattern. It is part of an evolutionary process. A fundamental problem in the Humanist context is this: What is it that the forces of art may accomplish for a vision of a better world?



For various reasons an examination of the criteria of art demands an analysis in terms of "form" and "content". With altering implications, these terms enter predominantly into art criticism and the history of aesthetic theory. They also figure prominently in what must be a Humanist Aesthetic.

By way of example, Jacques Maritain denies form to be bare abstract design and gives it an intellectualist interpretation in these terms:

Splendor formae, disait saint Thomas dans son langage precis de metaphysicien: car la 'forme', c'est-a-dire le principe qui fait la perfection propre de tout ce qui est, qui constitue et acheve les choses dans leur essence et dans leurs qualites, qui est enfin, si l'on peut ainsi parler, l'etre purement etre ou l'etre spirituel de toute realite, est avant tout le principe propre d'intelligibilite, la clarte propre de toute chose. Aussi bien toute forme est-elle un vestige ou un rayon de l'Intelligence creatrice imprime au coeur de l'etre cree. Tout ordre et toute proportion d'autre part est oeuvre d'intelligence. Et ainsi, dire avec les scolastiques que la beaute est le 'resplendissement de la forme sur les parties proportionnees de la matiere', c'est dire qu'elle est une fulguration d'intelligence sur une matiere intelligemment disposee.... Il importe toutefois de remarquer que dans le beau que nous avons appele connaturel a l'homme, et qui est propre a l'art humain, cet eclat de la forme, si purement intelligible qu'il puisse etre en lui-meme, est saisi dans le sensible et par le sensible, et non pas separement de lui.<sup>58</sup>

On the other hand, Clive Bell and Roger Fry agree on a different emphasis. They strip "form" of any connection

---

<sup>58</sup>Jacques Maritain, Art et Scolastique (Paris, Art Catholique, 1920), p. 33.



with connotation or representation. To them it is sheer abstract design characterized by a significance accruing to it by virtue of its manifestations of a peculiar aesthetic emotion. This emotional attribute is assumed to have originally prompted the creative process and to have ultimately characterized the design.<sup>59</sup>

Since the terms "design" and "form," "subject-matter" and "content" have been used interchangeably, it is necessary to clarify their meanings as used in this paper.

The simplest of these terms is "design" which is the arrangement of such elements as line, color, shape, tone, and texture in effecting a pleasing composition in spatial relationship. "Design" is a term applicable more particularly to individual works of art. It is associated with such qualifying terms as occult balance, bi-symmetry, gradation, rhythm, and proportion. Generally it refers to the arrangement of imagery regardless of technique of rendition. Its subtleties are in the intricacies of pattern not in those of expression.

"Design" might rightly be called "barren form". "Form" also refers to arrangement, but it implies particular effects created by various techniques in the process of

---

<sup>59</sup>Clive Bell, Art (New York, Frederick A. Stokes, 1913), Part I: "What is Art?"; Roger Fry, op. cit.



organizing the elements of design. More concisely, the creation of "form" is the arrangement of elements in space to produce meaning. It is a more comprehensive term which is particularly significant in distinguishing among "Schools" of art.

The work of the Classicist Jean Ingres (1780 - 1867) and that of the Post-Impressionist George Seurat (1859 - 1891) provide illustration. The Classicist's art possesses a marked solidarity of structural organization and linear pattern. For example, the painting "Madame Riviere" exhibits an harmonious rhythm of sweeping lines admirably adapted to the whole composition of rounded masses and to the very shape of the oval frame. Color is used only to accentuate the effect produced by line and to add decorative value. The result is not simply a pleasing preoccupation with purely visual values, but also an expression of character so firmly but subtly portrayed that its analysis is as difficult verbally as personality evaluation itself. Obviously the "form" of this Classicist art is arrangement of perceptual elements to communicate meaning in both intelligent understanding and feeling. That is, the picture suggests specific thoughts and stimulates a particular emotional attitude. However, "form" in any work of art does just that. It is the characteristic aspects of "form" which distinguish one work of art from that of any other "school".



For instance, in the second illustration, the Post-Impressionist turns to an organization particularly of color to create the illusion of natural appearance. It concentrates on the psycho-sensory effects of light, of color masses, of line direction, of line relationship and of analogous color range. This feature is particularly evident in Seurat's "A Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte". A further comparison could be made here between this use of color and that of the Romanticists. For example, Constable (1776 - 1837) in his "Wivenhoe Park, Essex" attempts to use color to copy nature and to produce the strongest emotional effect: a tremendous awesome sense of the expanse of nature oddly coupled with a sense of peaceful security, creating a total effect of nostalgia. The design or composition in this painting is not unusual. It has been used in numerous paintings, but Constable's use of that design, that is the "form" of his painting, is singularly different.

"Subject matter," as the third term requiring clarification, consists of the objects and topics which the artist uses in exploring the possibilities of his materials. It is concerned with an object without specifications: for example, "a child," not this particular child in this particular situation or with these attributes. It refers to an issue without commitments; such as "evolution".



It raises problems without suggested solutions; such as "a battle". The "subject matter" is the plastic material of design. It provides the unit masses, the shapes, the line and color possibilities which go to make pleasing patterns. In presenting an issue or a problem, it merely suggests the elements of design which may be introduced. However, as Langer points out, a seascape, in merely representing water, rocks and boats, or a still life, in merely representing oranges, apples and a vase of flowers, provide paint-patterns but not "expressive form".<sup>60</sup>

"Content" on the other hand refers to the connotative features of art. It involves the theme, including emotional impetus. A particular art content, or type of content, may persist through periods of form-types. For instance, the "tragic-mother" theme of the religious paintings of the Classical Renaissance was still in vogue when the Impressionists painted their "humble workers". "Content" is the predication given to the "subject matter". The effectiveness of the communication of "content" is the test of the perfection of "form".

The artist, by breaking away from tradition in form, may demand of his spectators a change in perspective on the sensory level. In the same manner, by changing "content,"

---

<sup>60</sup>Langer, op. cit., p. 206.



he may force his audience to take cognizance of a new aspect of human values. Tolstoy uses this definition of "content" to point out a distinction between good and bad art. "Good art," according to him, concerns itself always with the fundamental doctrines of the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God; whereas "bad art" merely appeals to the senses, touching the senses in a temporary excitation to save individuals from boredom.<sup>61</sup> Humanism cannot accept the details of this analysis with respect to the particular content with which he would delimit art. However, the principle of Tolstoy's theory is consistent with two Humanist contentions; namely, that good art has, as one of its important features, the significance of its content, and that art which merely excites the senses with its pleasing arrangements or which merely reawakens a sentimentalism in the naturally sentimental, is bad art -- if it is art at all. The Humanist maintains that the distinction between good and bad art is based upon content; whereas the distinction between art and non-art depends on form.

Because art must have expressive content and because it must satisfy a basic impulse of unification, it must have form. There must be a coherency of perceptual, emotional

---

<sup>61</sup>Leo Tolstoy, What is Art? (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1899).



and intellectual pattern. There is something of a sense of expectation of fulfilment of design. However this anticipation is characteristic of all activities of life to some extent, of activities quite remote from art. Possibly this is the relationship between art and life which draws forth the comment that "life is art". However, in art, the intellectual, emotional, and perceptual patterns are set in relief to heighten anticipation at penultimate points. It is not just the realization of a spatial pattern which brings satisfaction, for instance, on the deft stroke of a particular sallow green on the face of a Van Gogh self-portrait, but the realization of the significance of what that stroke helps to express.

Particular educational significance is to be found in a consideration of these three distinctive patterns of visual design, feeling, and thought. Somehow these three form an integral unification in a work of art. They are forgotten individually through their collective impact. If they are analyzed separately, the analyst for that moment is carrying on a post-mortem, he is not seeing the creation as a work of art. Similarly, when there is an inconsistency between the design, the thought, or the emotional implication, forcing the spectator to see them separately, there is poor art form -- or only artistry or cartoon, which frequently arrests attention by that type of contrast which is all the better for its incongruity.



True art, however, must not merely have design; it must have reason for its design. In other words, it must have form to carry over content and to make an aesthetic appeal. It is the variation in form which becomes attached to the temper of the age. Through the use of form, the artist expresses his coherency with his environment. Each age has a language of art which it can best understand. In creating form the artist is influenced by the tenor of his life, but his familiarity with the strain and stress, harmony and adaptation of everyday living of the people of his period, race, class or community. When he adopts a form understandable to the people of his age, his status is at least temporarily assured. However, sometimes he can express himself only in a form which is foreign to his times. Then, as with Cezanne (1839 - 1906), he must wait until he or his followers have taught the people to read this new symbolic language. On this fact rests the Humanist's stress on the need to educate the masses of the people through a greater exposure to art with a view to developing an appreciation of the significantly human power of symbolization and of understanding the purpose of symbolism employed by people of other societies. By learning the significance of other forms, one's language-in-art becomes enriched with new metaphors.

Form then is the symbolic device by which artist and



audience share understanding regarding content which is an index of the values of the age. By changing the content of his art, the artist invites his audience to accept an altered system of values. If the artist finds that a different type of form communicates this content more expediently, he is spoken of as changing the art of his day or as tending away from the school of art of which his former works belonged. The form, however, is actually the language of the artist. Since each artist finds himself more facile with a particular form, it is seldom that he is able to make the change to advantage, just as one who is adept in his native tongue, has difficult acquiring facility with a new one.

To some extent at least, modern man has learned to appreciate art forms of other ages -- to understand them and to see the surging vitality in the most saintly of Renaissance Madonnas. Although art-language (that is, the type of art form employed) changed, the same theme of wholesome womanhood is presented by the Impressionists with dexterity and freedom of technique which is quite different from that used by Raphael. Clive Bell may be right in his claim that since the Byzantine primitives set their mosaics at Ravenna, converting irrelevant details of their subject matter into significant form in a striking simplification, no artist in Europe has created form of greater significance unless it



be Cezanne.<sup>62</sup>

Nevertheless, if modern art forms have not generally been as significant, their possibilities are greater by virtue of the artist's greater freedom to reveal his beliefs, unafraid of the dictates of tradition. As Bell says,

For an artist to believe that his art is concerned with religion, politics, morals, psychological or scientific truth is well: it keeps him up out of sentimental aestheticism; it keeps to hand a suitable artistic problem.<sup>62</sup>

The Humanist observes that in no period in the history of man have the masses of men progressed so far as they have today towards a concern with the fundamental issues of life in all of these avenues of human thought. What is more, not only have the masses learned to read the linguistic sign, they are also learning to read the aesthetic symbol.

---

<sup>62</sup>Bell, op. cit., Part III: "The Christian Slope," p. 130.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 146.



## CHAPTER VII

## AESTHETIC EMOTION

Some artists and critics insist that form is the final and all inclusive criterion of art. Among these, Roger Fry and Clive Bell have been particularly influential. The latter advances an "Aesthetic Hypothesis" which maintains that the fundamental requisite of art is "significant form" as the manifestation of a peculiar and unique "aesthetic emotion". This strange emotion is purported to be distinct from all other emotions. It is an intuitive feeling for "reality" -- that is, "reality" in the Platonic sense of the essential "essence" of things.

The Humanist must view this hypostatized emotion with doubt: after all, the emotions of human life have a way of displaying themselves that leaves no question as to their existence. How then can any single emotion which gives such impetus to man that he creates monuments of artistic wonder, be nowhere else evident in daily life? The position is without supporting evidence. It would seem that Bell was sincerely imbued with the desire to stress the importance of art by giving it the dignity of exclusiveness, by attributing to it an elite emotion possessed only by an aesthetically sensitive few, an aristocracy of aesthetes. In contrast, the Humanistic position affirms



the importance of art by showing its pervasive and intimate association with human life from which Bell would exile it. Bell admits that he has no basis for his assumption other than a strong personal feeling regarding its validity.

Surely this "aesthetic feeling" is rather a combination or resultant of various emotions. From an original state of emotional profusion and diffusion, these ordinary emotions of everyday life resolve themselves into a pattern, like the resultant force which is different in direction and intensity from any of its components. Before objects or situations can be called beautiful, a diffusion of emotions must have been experienced, comparable to the random physical movements which continue in the process of learning a skill until a pattern of movement is achieved. The unification of these feelings may rightly be called an "aesthetic emotion".

When looking at things which are beautiful in the world, the aesthete is quite right in saying that his feelings are inexpressible verbally. In fact, they may not become resolved into a pattern which could give them any claim to aesthetic oneness until an expression of their unification in art form has been achieved either in the imagination or in actual execution through art techniques.

Able support for this view has already been cited



from Yrjo Hirn's The Origin of Art.<sup>64</sup> Certainly the artist, while pointing to his masterpiece, can rightly declare, "This is what I feel or think or know." This desire to clarify his emotions is the same innate impulse towards unification to which reference has already been made in this paper -- an impulse to which can be attributed man's greatest, if not all, of his achievements as a rational being.

Although Tolstoy does not identify a specific aesthetic emotion, he does isolate common emotions in artistic communication. His attitude stems directly from his definition of art. He says,

To evoke in oneself a feeling one has experienced, and having evoked it in oneself, then, by means of movements, lines, colors, sounds, or forms expressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others may experience the same feeling -- this is the activity of art. Art is a human activity, consisting in this, that one man consciously, by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that other people are infected by these feelings, and also experience them.<sup>65</sup>

To this view, the Humanist would add that these "feelings" are not isolated emotions but rather resolutions of contrasting emotions common to all normal people. This synthesis into a communicable aesthetic emotion is quite different from the individual ones which collectively

---

<sup>64</sup>Hirn, op. cit., p. 105. (p. 46 of this paper)

<sup>65</sup>Tolstoy, op. cit., p. 43.



impelled the artist's drive towards unification. No one emotion enters into a great work of art as an isolated element. The aesthetic effect in a single painting cannot be labelled by any one of the names which we give to the several emotions of life. Nor is it a single esoteric emotion unique to the aesthetic mind.

The Humanist can only partially agree with the condition which Tolstoy places as requisites to all "real art". He enumerates three conditions on which the degree of "emotional infectiousness" in art depends: first, the individuality of feeling; second, the clarity of its expression; and, third, the sincerity of the artist. He distinguishes between "real" and "counterfeit" art on the basis of the "infectiousness of form". The latter point the Humanist finds congenial to his views. However, in Tolstoy's emphasis on the individuality of the emotion communicated, he seems to take away much of the significance which he at first attributed to form, by making form a type of illustration of particular manifestations of some designated emotion.

This type of emphasis given to the illustration of a single emotion may also tend towards sentimentality. A synthesis of emotional appeal is more likely to ensure restraint, which is an acknowledged characteristic of all great art. It is conducive to subtlety of expression, which goes hand in hand with restraint.



Regarding Tolstoy's second condition (the clarity of expression), one may prefer to direct attention to emphasis. A great deal of art has been spoiled by the artist's endeavor to please an audience rather than to create expressive form. That is, through an abundant effort at clarity, he has violated Tolstoy's third condition of "sincerity". On the other hand, the intricacies which confuse the modern observer can be attributed to an endeavor "to be modern" rather than to carry significance. Its symbolic language fails to be stimulating to the casual observer.

The Humanist's idea of unity of aesthetic emotion is quite different from that of either Tolstoy or Bell in another significant respect. According to Bell, an aesthetic emotion exists in all its "oneness" before any creation of art form takes place. It does not achieve its synthesis through art, but exists prior to art and is the condition of it, just as Tolstoy's "common emotion" exists prior to art and provides the artist with a purpose in communication. Not only does aesthetic emotion for Bell become merely the condition of artistic creation, but it receives no synthetic transformation itself in the process of a technical rendering of form. There is an expression of this emotion, then, only in so far as an art product emerges as an effect of its presence. Furthermore, the condition which in turn gave rise to the aesthetic emotion was an intellectual (either



intuitive or rational) grasp of some significance in reality. This insight, charged with the atomic emotion, is itself expressed as "form" which is "significant" -- and, hence, is art.<sup>66</sup>

The use of the double terminology "significant form" is redundant. A spatial arrangement without significance would be only design; whereas design given significance becomes form. Bell speaks of form in art as the arrangement of elements such as lines, colors, and spaces, according to some unknown and mysterious law, in such a way that this designed relationship moves the spectator in a particular way.<sup>67</sup> But, if it does this, it has artistic form; that is, it has significance which is the essential characteristic in the definition of "form".

There is another issue here that is more fundamental than this linguistic one. Bell makes form not merely a requisite feature of art, but the one fundamental criterion. Roger Fry supports Bell's analysis including his contention that "significant form" and an "aesthetic emotion" are intrinsically bound together in an aesthetic whole which is the art product. However, Fry's treatment is less speculative. He omits the metaphysical implications regarding an

---

<sup>66</sup>Bell, op. cit., Part I.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., Part I.



insight into the essence of reality as the basis of aesthetic emotion. Whereas Bell attributes the stimulus for the production of art to something within the artist, Fry places emphasis on something within the object which impels the artist. Fry clearly sets out the characteristics of "artistic vision". It seeks to grasp in situations and objects, those elements which are singular. These elements are generally unnoticed although they are features which are both significant and common or universally known.<sup>68</sup>

This view is more in keeping with the tenets of the Humanist, who would carry Fry's position a step further to declare that creative endeavor arises from a situation of such familiarity that one is able to grasp the particular relationship which enhances it. That is, one is able to grasp the significant attribute which makes it important to the emotional and rational life of man. Art then becomes a common property of the common man, as well as of the intellectual. Forms that appeal to the intellectual may be different from those which appeal to the common man. Generally, however, it is in content that the greatest difference will lie, depending on the degree to which lives and cultures differ at each social level. The point is that the common man can appreciate art and enjoy aesthetic activity as long

---

<sup>68</sup>Fry, op. cit., p. 47 - 54, 84.



as life is interesting to him and, hence, as long as situations are familiar to him.

What is familiarity but the grasp of structural relationships of things, which comes with intimate and repeated association with objects of one's world. This view does not contradict but compliments Hume's view that the familiar may be utterly incomprehensible but accepted because it does not surprise one any more. The artist brings these accepted features back into focus.

Aesthetic activity involving the familiar carries man beyond the practical demands of life. He may be initiated into this situation of familiarity through these practical demands of life; however, the inherent mental need which seeks unification of everything that comes into contact with his senses, carries him beyond all practical needs on the animal level to what may seem to be the most useless associations of memory elements and perceptual elements in a perpetual art-activity of the mind.

Quite in contrast to the common notion that only a few are specially gifted with the ability to appreciate art, the Humanist insists that all men have the gift of art and that this artistic sense is more easily developed than the practical one. It could be argued that more people are devoid of a practical sense than of the aesthetic. Generally, however, the latter ability is confined to mental



activity. A great amount of leisure time is required for this ability to be made manifest in artistic expression. Our highly complex industrial civilization has provided ample opportunity for the refinement of the practical sense through extensive programs of education. It would seem that, with the increase of leisure time, attention should be turned towards providing greater opportunity for the refinement of the aesthetic sense.



## CHAPTER VIII

## ESSENTIALS OF A WORKABLE THEORY OF ART

The consideration of design, form, subject-matter, and content promotes the question, "Is art discursive?" Langer distinguishes the communicative processes of language and art? "All language has a form which requires us to string out our ideas even though their objects rest one within the other.... This property of verbal symbolism is known as discursiveness."<sup>69</sup> By referring to "ideas" in art, Bell and Fry refer to thoughts which cannot be linguistically stretched out in this spatial order and which are ineffable or uncommunicable by means of words. That is, Langer, Bell and Fry give a unique function to art which makes it the language of non-discursive ideas. The assumption is that each type of art, though it can conceivably express what is expressed by another type, is a means most suited to a certain "art-content".

This belief in a unique function of art is quite in conformity with the Humanist conception of purpose in the graphic and plastic arts. Art is a creative synthesis by which the symbols not only undergo a spatial arrangement in design but also take part in a transformation of

---

<sup>69</sup>Langer, op. cit., p. 77.



emotional and ideational elements into a coherent and consistent unification in "form".

The Humanist also agrees with Bell and Fry in denying that the quality of art is determined only by its adherence to particular conceptions of life, such as devotion to deity. They refuse to elevate subject matter to the place of significance given to it by Tolstoy. They maintain that the quality of production is dependent mainly on the sincerity with which the artist sets out to communicate. This purpose must be fortified by an intense emotion. That is, form and content are the important factors.

Nevertheless, a freedom in choice of subject matter is basic to ensuring the maximum degree of significance in form and content. The Humanist insists that the possibilities of art become broadened through an understanding of the way of life which Humanism promotes. He is opposed to narrowing creeds. A wide range of free activity of the human mind must not be denied. The allegiance of the human heart to things which reason finds beautiful and worthy in the world must not be stifled. The artist who is aware that the whole world is his subject matter, who is free to choose his beliefs for himself, and who uses what he wishes as the content of his art, will have a deeper sincerity in expression than he whose subject matter has been determined by conformity.



In review, the Bell-Fry analysis is helpful in drawing attention to an interrelationship of visual, emotional, and intellectual patterns in artistic creation. These critics admit the importance of content in supplying that significance in symbolism which converts mere design to form. However, the Humanist disagrees with the emphasis which they place on form regardless of its communicative function. The difference in opinion, then, is merely a matter of degree of emphasis on form and content.

It is to Tolstoy that the Humanist turns for support regarding the communicative value of art. On the basis of his concept of form, Tolstoy distinguishes between real and counterfeit art. On the basis of his concept of content, he distinguishes between good and bad art. He makes the infectiousness of form the all-important criterion of good art. The content of art, he says, is dependent on the purpose of art, and that purpose should be to foster the further well-being of mankind.<sup>70</sup> That is, to the extent that a work of art fulfils this purpose it is good, and to

---

<sup>70</sup>Tolstoy, op. cit., p.265: "The religious perception of our time -- which consists in acknowledging that the aim of life (both collective and individual) is the union of mankind -- is already so sufficiently distinct that people have now only to reject the false theory of beauty -- according to which enjoyment is considered to be the purpose of art -- and religious perception will naturally take its place as the guide to the art of our times."



the extent that it fails it is bad. This analysis is a Humanist description of both a product and an impulse of art, but there is need for a further analysis before it can be declared the Humanist ideal.

Normal human life is an endeavor to work out a plan which, either egotistically or altruistically -- or both -- seeks an intimate communion with others in order to resolve differences. Art is but a refinement of this process. Professor Dewitt Parker's comments are pertinent here:

It is, to be sure, a common affectation of artists that they create for themselves alone.... But the behaviour of all artists belies their words; there is nothing that they actually seek more than the understanding, appreciation, admiration of their fellows; even Keats suffered, as we know, from the coldness of the public and the castigation of the critics. Sometimes, as with Emily Dickinson, some repression may interfere with communication, but such cases are the exception that prove the rule. The public for whom the artist creates may be only a small group of fellow artists or connoisseurs, but however large or small it be, the artist is always one of a group, and his creations are social objects, available for anyone who has the sensibility and training requisite for understanding them.<sup>71</sup>

This interpretation of art has a Humanist significance. It declares art to be for the people and insinuates a need for education, which indeed is the demand requisite to all human progress. The recluse artist who claims to create entirely for his own satisfaction is telling only

---

<sup>71</sup>Dewitt H. Parker, Human Values (Ann Arbor, Michigan: George Wahr, 1944), p. 325.



a partial truth. He can be suspected of fearing that he will not be understood or admired. He may well be suspected of being afraid to test the communicative value of his art. That is, he manifests the very human fear of failure. Indeed, he may engage in artistic endeavors as a means of recording his impressions -- this record-keeping is also a form of communication. This type of artistic activity may be encouraged by another fundamental human desire; namely, that of ensuring a vicarious immortality. He will then appeal to the generations to follow, who may appreciate his work. They may understand his language because they may be able to interpret the art form which he employs. In fact, art which does possess this permanent appeal is great art -- in Tolstoy's terminology, it is "good art".

The content of this "good art" is composed of themes which have the quality of uniting man in a common feeling. Tolstoy, despite his very plausible theory, could see only two themes worthy of this connotation: namely, the theme of the union of man with God and that of the universal brotherhood of man. He failed to see the rich variety of other themes which might have desirable social effects. He also overplayed the idea of immediacy of appeal, implying that the public is always ready to comprehend fully the art forms used.



Tolstoy condemns modern art because it overplays sexual desire, weariness of life, and inordinate pride.<sup>72</sup> The difficulty with the modern concentration on these themes, however, is not that art is moral, but that they have been advanced without any emphasis on their significance to human life, and that they have become boring in their repetition without variation of form. With this emphasis and this variation in each painting, a theme may acquire a fresh vitality giving it an enduring quality. The humanist's diagnosis of the condition pointed out by Tolstoy is that the modern product has a tendency towards mere amusement and sensationalism. It carries no sincerity in effecting unity of perception, emotion, and thought. It becomes not only indefinite in form to the point of absurdity, but also colorful in content to the point of affectedness and sentimentality.

Contrary to being moralistically inclined toward any code of evaluation, art must accept a relativism in values which is indifferent to moral judgments. Its subject matter may be any object or any side of any principle. In art activity, the whole range of values may find expression. The sincerity of the artist can be ensured only by granting this freedom of expression. Tolstoy does not seem

---

<sup>72</sup>Tolstoy, op. cit., p. 152.



to be aware that this scope is necessary for that very quality of sincerity which he places as the foremost factor in determining what is real art and what is pseudo.<sup>73</sup> The subject matter of art may be as ugly as anything known by the term "ugly," but the design or composition must be attractive and the form must be beautiful.

The process of artistic creation becomes selective of subject-matter only in so far as it concerns relationships effecting a coherency of visual, emotional, and ideational elements. Consistency in form must go hand-in-hand with infectiousness of content: neither of them alone will account for the aesthetic appeal of a product. For instance, there is an extreme emotional "infectiousness" (in the Tolstoyan sense) experienced in the modern tear-jerking movies, wherein the infectiousness is actually a block to aesthetic appeal.<sup>74</sup> Clearly this quality alone is not a sufficient criterion of art. This fact goes to show the danger of trying to confine an art theory to a single all-inclusive principle. Aesthetic philosophy cannot limit its concern to content, neither to infectiousness in purpose nor to sincerity in attitude. An adequate theory must include selectiveness in effecting coherent form,

---

<sup>73</sup>Tolstoy, op. cit., p. 182.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., p. 227.



realizing that faulty presentation may damn a work as non-art more assuredly than does inadequate content.

The constant relationship between content and form in a workable theory of art becomes more evident when consideration is given to the reasons why certain artistic endeavors have failed. In the first place, the failure of the audience to recognize the purpose of form is not always the fault of the insensitivity of the audience. The lack of significance of the symbols employed may be due to a lack of clarity through technical inadequacy.

Secondly, quite similar to this problem is the lack of clarity through a slovenliness in communication; that is, in the use of symbols to convey meaning. Although intended to communicate the content, poor symbols cause an obscurity of meaning. This weakness in much modern art produces not much more than picture-puzzles. There is an optimum degree of symbolization beyond which the artist cannot go if he is to remain fair to his audience and to his purpose. The artist must realize the conventional forms of his time -- the language which his audience will understand. If he wishes to substitute another form, he must adapt the new form to his purpose in such a way that it is not only a substitute but also an improvement on the old -- a newer and better conveyance for content.



Those who do not subscribe to the view expounded above may argue that the artist is painting for himself alone. Indeed, Langer once pointed out that the Freudian analysis does account for cryptic symbolism in pure self-expression. However, this fact is not a denial of the Humanist view. It is a qualification or description of the nature of some modern developments in art. It is also a justification of the freedom demanded by the modern artist. Herbert Read's assertions underline this two-fold debt to psycho-analysis in an understanding of symbolism.<sup>75</sup> First, it shows that art can have hidden symbolic significance; that is, "the power of art in a civilization is attributable to his expression of the deeper levels of the personality." However, art must remain "expression" or communication. Secondly, it shows that, because art evidently need not have a superficial representational purpose, the artist is free to express himself completely in the abstract.

However, a belabored or excessive symbolism does not conform even to that theory which would make art merely an effective catharsis. Although the symbolism be non-objective rather than representational, any lack of spontaneity would negate the cathartic effect. Such an art neither communicates

---

<sup>75</sup>Read, op. cit., p. 92.



effectively nor produces an immediate release of the artist's tensions. It does not effect an essential unification for either the artist or the observer. In fact, it produces a greater complexity when its symbolism is exaggerated beyond the normal symbolic value of the subject-matter employed. This over-loading of picture elements to a far-fetched symbolism is detrimental mainly because it loses its communicative value. All that an observer gets out of such a painting is what he brings to it and reads into it.

The failure of a work of art may be due to a third reason other than these technical errors. The confusion of concepts in the mind of the artist may result in an indefiniteness of content. The form of such art will not have the directness of purpose required to make it meaningful. When the artist has nothing to say, he does nothing but design, and the audience looks in vain for something which is not there.

On the other hand, a fourth, related fault may present itself. Sometimes the artist has much to say but fails to effect a synthesis in executing arrangement in form. This lack of simplification is as fatal as the over-use of symbolism: one overloads a symbol with ideas; the other overloads an idea with symbols.

A fifth fault again shows the close relationship of form and content. When the artist is deceived by his personal,



emotional attachment to his subject-matter, he may fail to realize the poverty of his idea. He may then produce a work which is ruined by displaying an inconsistency between the grandness of form and the banality of content. The appeal becomes sentimental rather than aesthetic. The drive is purely an emotional one attached to a personal affinity towards the subject-matter. It is not an aesthetic impulse towards unification calling for the specific form created. Such is the lack of restraint which blocks aesthetic appeal in the tear-jerking movies. In such productions the problems, although both human and significant, are not equal to the intensity of effort employed to convey the concepts involved. Because of the lack of opportunity and education, the masses of people generally exhibit a comparable fault of allowing their personal attachment to subject-matter to lead to an indulgence in personal, stereotyped symbolism. That is, their attachment interferes with their understanding of the content which the art forms were intended to convey.

Good art leaves much to the imagination. The power of suggestion of its symbols is much stronger than the power of direct, imitative representation of pictorial elements. Art appreciation then depends also on a type of creative genius or a developed creative talent on the part of the spectator. It is the work of the artist to so arrange his



symbols that they stimulate this faculty. That is, spatial, tonal, textural, linear, and chromatic relationships must correspond to emotional and connotative relationships. The immediate synthesis effected in the mind of the spectator should be at least an approximate of the expression of content which the artist wishes to convey.

The distinction between subject-matter, content design and form have been considered so as to show the necessary relationship between content and form in the production of good art. These distinctions have been made also to show that the causes of failure in art are due to some type of deficiency in content, in form, or in their essential relationship. In the light of this analysis consideration may now be given to the objectives which the Humanist would consider to be fundamental to the school's art program.



## CHAPTER IX

## HUMANIST OBJECTIVES IN THE SCHOOL'S ART PROGRAM

Humanists have expressed the view that art education for all is essential to modern civilization.<sup>77</sup> It must be, not merely a phase, but a continuous process. It seems that in a civilization developing towards automation, certain values of an art program would become magnified. A summation of main objectives set forth by modern educators and endorsed by the Humanist should substantiate these views.

The first objective stems directly from the Humanist's concept of aesthetic experience as a synthesis of perceptual, emotional and intellectual experience. The art activity must go beyond mere illustration of chosen subject-matter or mimic representation of nature. It must go beyond the execution of skilful design involving only the organization of perceptual elements. It must purposefully provide training in the creation of "form" communicating significant content. That is, it must provide experience in organizing perceptual, emotional and intellectual elements in order to communicate to others something which the artist-student has found significant about life. The National Art Education Association endorses this view:

---

<sup>77</sup>Lamont, op. cit., p. 229 - 230.



Of the new values gaining wide support within the past decade, this concept (personality integration through art) is, perhaps, the one most strongly emphasized.... It is also the one value which many authors feel to be peculiar to the arts, offering potential experiences which cannot be gained from any other type of activity in the present curriculum.

Although there are varying explanations of the means of this benefit, the one point of agreement is that creative and appreciational experience operates through the integrated function of several elements of the individual's personality. The most commonly noted of these elements are emotion and intelligence.

Dewey, who proposed this idea at an early date, suggested that aesthetic productivity entails the integrated functioning of emotion, imagination, and intelligence. In recent years, Herbert Read has become one of the foremost exponents of the concept. He suggests that there "...exists within the mind of the child, no less than that of the adult, a psychic process or activity, taking place below the level of consciousness, which tends to organize the sketchy or rudimentary images present in the unconscious into a harmonious pattern." He feels that psychic equilibrium, the wholesome intellectual emotional function of the human being, is only possible when this process of unconscious integration is going on.

During the same period (1940 - 1953) a considerable number of writers have emphasized this concept. It seems to have become a vital part of the theory of art education.<sup>78</sup>

A second objective, in keeping with Humanist stress on individual worth, sets up creative self-expression as a means by which certain detrimental features of the highly industrialized world can be counter-balanced. In the process of expanding and utilizing human knowledge to control forces of nature, man has brought on two great industrial

---

<sup>78</sup>Vincent Lanier, "The Status of Current Objectives in Art Education," Fifth Yearbook of the National Art Education Association, (Washington, 1954), pp. 122 - 123.



revolutions. The first, as Norbert Wiener puts it, brought the "devaluation of the human arm"; the second, the "devaluation of the human brain."<sup>79</sup> The dignity which accompanies worth threatens to be lost to the man of only mediocre accomplishments. Even those who excel lose their identity in the surge towards organization-on-the-grand-scale. Conformity is becoming the rule of the day.

To the Humanist, these developments are wrong in that certain necessary complementary developments have not accompanied them. There must be provisions made for those activities which will permit members of a society to demonstrate their individuality. Society itself would become static if this essential condition were not provided. Art is one area which permits this freedom. Here the individual can present his reactions and his insights regarding the rapidly changing world around him.

Dr. Edwin Ziegfeld develops this point to some length:

Mechanization has already made man gravely doubtful of his value, for the monstrous cruelties of this century could only have occurred because the value of human life is lightly held. We are faced now with virtual uselessness of a large segment of the population at least as far as skills are concerned. No man can live with dignity unless he is confident that he is contributing to life in some worthwhile way. If the opportunity for becoming essential workers and citizens is denied many people, the bright material prospects of

---

<sup>79</sup>Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics and Society (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1954).



automation will be accompanied by the virtual slavery of man in a world of neon lights and fast automobiles. Has ever the problem of maintaining the worth and dignity of man loomed as large?

For some time now western civilization has been going through a period in which institutions have become increasingly large and powerful and in which the individual has been losing status. This is observable in such manifestations as "big government," "big business," big labor organizations, collective bargaining, social security. I am not saying that these are good or bad, but I am saying that each of these tends to remove the responsibility of making decisions from the individual and he is subject to the decisions of impersonal bodies and institutions.... Along with, or perhaps part of, this great move towards institutionalism have come tremendous pressures for conformity.... Conformity and adjustment are made synonymous. In fact, the great emphasis on group activity is not unrelated to the trend toward ironing out individual differences. I am not saying that group activity is not important. But unless it is accompanied by opportunities for full individual development, it is a dangerous thing.

My own feeling is that our entire society has moved dangerously far in the direction of institutionalization, and conformity, and that a movement towards restoration of the individual as being of basic importance is in order. We know that the basic political struggle which divides the world resolves around the importance or non-importance of the individual. There is no doubt as to where the free world stands on this issue, but there is a real danger that values for which we stand may be lost by developments of a non-political nature. The struggle for the importance of the individual is waged, not only with our enemies but among ourselves.

In the world of giantism in which we live the areas in which the individual remains as an effective and controlling agent are constantly dwindling. In fact, the arts are one of the few areas which do remain and because of that they become increasingly important -- not only educationally, but culturally. Probably nothing in the world needs more to be said and proven at this moment than that any man is different from every other man. Undoubtedly, this explains the works of many contemporary artists whose work is mystifying or incomprehensible. I believe that they, with the acuity and sensitivity of artists to social need, are saying what needs to be said, that a person has a right to his



26

individuality, that it is a necessity..... Art, better than any other area leads itself to the development of individuation.<sup>80</sup>

Lanier points out another phase of this objective of creative self-expression.<sup>81</sup> He predicts that current research will provide substantial evidence to demonstrate the value of this type of education as a positive factor in the development of creative scientists and scholars.

Viktor Lowenfeld (whose work appears on the list which the Department of Education recommends for use in Alberta schools) endorses this second objective and presents another aspect of it.<sup>82</sup> He suggests that free expression in art can provide a child with growing self-confidence. He then adds that, since almost all mental and emotional maladjustments are related to a lack of self-confidence, creative expression through art can serve to minimize the occurrence of these problems.

The establishment of the International Society for Education Through Art (INSEA) has presented a third objective, which is congenial to the Humanist concept of a

---

<sup>80</sup>Edwin Ziegfeld, "International Freedom and Art Education," Sixth Yearbook of the National Art Education Association, (Washington, 1955), pp. 41 - 45.

<sup>81</sup>Lanier, "A Commentary on Research into Teaching Process," Ninth Yearbook of the National Art Education Association, (Washington, 1958), p. 114.

<sup>82</sup>Viktor Lowenfeld, Creative and Mental Growth (New York: Macmillan Co., 1952), pp. 5 - 6.



world society. This organization is an outgrowth of a 1951 seminar held under the auspices of UNESCO (which promotes international activities of an educational, scientific and cultural nature.) A symposium of art educators from many countries lead to the 1953-publication Education and Art, which underlined the premise on which INSEA was founded; namely, that art is basic to education. The publication also emphasized the theme that, through cultural interchange, much can be done to promote international understanding, respect and sympathy.

The purpose of this aspect of education would not be to resolve all differences. A nation, like an individual, must preserve its identity. As Thomas Munro says, "Each people can and should remain true to its own main, cherished traditions, acting as their custodian and representative to the outside world."<sup>83</sup> He goes on to explain that each country could select and adapt ideas, techniques and styles that would enhance or revitalize its own cultural heritage. Editor Ziegfeld expresses the same view in referring to the objectives of the symposium:

Based upon the realization that art education to be valid must be related to the culture of which it is part, the publication was conceived as a symposium of opinions and experiences of contributors from many countries that would give some idea of what was being

---

<sup>83</sup>Thomas Munro, "Art and International Understanding," Education and Art, A Symposium (Paris: UNESCO, 1953), p. 117.



done in art education throughout the world, and that would be capable of adaptation and interpretation in relation to local conditions.<sup>84</sup>

The pertinence of this objective to the Humanist view is evident in reiterated explanations given in successive yearly reports of both NAEA and INSEA.

In the 1958 report of NAEA, John S. Keel interprets the views of Sir Herbert Read:

Read's conception of society is a "community of individuals," a state of culture so ordered that the individual can live a natural life "attending to what is within". Politics and economic factors are important only in so far as they contribute to a healthy condition consistent with the demands of human nature.... Art is an attempt to revert from the disintegration induced by civilization to organic modes of being. By developing ease and harmony of expression between man and man, we learn to trust one another, to share experiences, and generally to develop that community of thought and aspiration which constitutes a culture. History shows that "when these symbols become clichés, and men become blind to beauty and originality in thought and expression, then immediately the culture declines and by an infallible law of human history, the civilization then perished." Societies and cultures flourish only so long as they express themselves in vital symbols. "Art...is the rhythmic beating of the heart of a civilization and when that beat loses its rhythm, the civilization is doomed."<sup>85</sup>

In the 1955 report of NAEA, Ziegfeld makes this comment:

---

<sup>84</sup>Edwin Ziegfeld, "Introduction" to A Symposium on Education and Art (Paris: UNESCO, 1953), p. 16.

<sup>85</sup>John S. Keel, "Sir Herbert Read's Theory of Aesthetic Education," Ninth Yearbook of the National Art Education Association (Washington: 1958), p. 25.



The development of international understanding is ... the need in which education can play an important role. In view of the developments in the world today, it would seem only natural that there should be an increasing interest in art education at the international level.... We live in a world which has suddenly become small. We are brought up sharply against realities which had previously been of no concern but which we can no longer avoid.... But this closeness has its compensations, too, for we find that there are many people throughout the world who share our ideals and our hopes and who are our allies in working for human betterment.... It is probably more correct to say that art is a non-verbal form of communication and is, therefore, free of many of the difficulties and limitations that plague verbal communication.<sup>86</sup>

In the 1953 report of INSEA, Munro says:

Every nation, race and people can learn something of value from every other, and contribute something to our common heritage of civilization. This is especially true of the arts. Even in the remotest jungles and deserts there is hardly a tribe or village that does not possess its characteristic folklore, songs, dances, rituals, buildings, costumes, or handicrafts. Their beliefs and attitudes toward life may be very different, but in studying them, people can become more aware of universal human problems and of different ways of solving them. The more wealthy, complex, industrialized nations have impressive arts of their own; but in many instances they have lost some of the values of life on a simpler scale which are to be found in smaller social units living closer to nature. For many years art experts in the world's great capitals have been showing increased respect for the arts of so-called primitive people, recognizing that they contain some admirable features often lacking in arts of advanced urban civilizations. Through centuries of war, trade, and colonization, much damage has been done to the arts and folk traditions of smaller and weaker groups. Some efforts, but not enough, are now being made to preserve what is left.

By contributing to the best of its cultural products to world civilization, each people can help to

---

<sup>86</sup>Ziegfeld, *op. cit.*, (Sixth Yearbook NAEE), p. 46



build rich and diversified cultural heritage for posterity.<sup>87</sup>

In keeping with this third objective of international cultural development, the Humanist would stress the purpose of art in achieving a social integration of heterogeneous groups within a nation or a community. Munro points out that "in cosmopolitan cities like those of the United States of America, groups of different national origins are encouraged to cherish their ancestral arts and cultural memories, while learning enough from other groups to cooperate well in community life."<sup>88</sup>

Lanier recalls that the development of cultural appreciation has long been an objective in many art curriculums.<sup>89</sup> However, the emphasis has been on the acquisition of knowledge of art from the past, mainly to set worthy examples. The Humanist curriculum would retain this objective as one dimension of a much broader outlook.

Lanier draws attention to another aim of art education gaining extensive recognition in America; namely, experience in social relationships. He declares that democratic goals are "attained by the continued development of social values, which in turn, develop as we act."<sup>90</sup>

---

<sup>87</sup>Munro, op. cit. (UNESCO Symposium), p. 116.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>89</sup>Lanier, op. cit. (Fifth Yearbook NAEA), p. 114.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 118.



This view actually presents another aspect of the Humanist concept of the duty of the individual to contribute to community harmony and progress. The emphasis here is on sharing experience and ideas. Lanier explains the objective in these words:

Good human relationship has become one of the principal desirable outcomes in American education. The focus of concern among educators has been the development of content and methods in school situations to provide children with opportunities for effective, harmonious group activities. Art educators have suggested the value of experiences in the arts towards this end. D'Amico, using the mural painting activity as an example, describes how children can learn to work with and help one another, respect the capacities of others, and learn to contribute to the progress of a group to a common goal.... Thus, the individual can develop insight into the meaning his work has for him and for others and can communicate those meanings to others "immediately and totally".<sup>91</sup>

The Humanist, mindful of the nature of growth through an educational process, accepts intermediate goals as means to these greater ends already discussed in this paper. For example, the development of technical skills in design must be a step if the lack of these skills is not to stand in the way of expression. However, this concern must not come too early lest it hinder creative development. For the student, there is always the danger that technical perfection may become the "end" rather than a "means," the

---

<sup>91</sup>Ibid.



final objective rather than a step in the total process.<sup>92</sup>

Thus it is fitting to look at these steps in an art program which present "means" that assume, for a time, the proportion of minor "ends" or objectives.

Art educators are now in general agreement that the beginning of the process must involve random experiences in recording observations of the world as the child knows it. The objective is any form of individual expression with emphasis as the pupil sees fit. The teacher assists in providing situations which will encourage an early experience in integrating perceptual, emotional, and intellectual elements. Read further elaborates on the function of the teacher in this educative process -- his views are reported by John S. Keel:

Art is a way of education, not so much a subject to be taught as a method of teaching any and all subjects. It is a method which seeks its discipline in the intuitive perception of form, harmony, and proportion, and in the requirements of tool and material. It is an educational method in which the

---

<sup>92</sup>Ziegfeld, op. cit. (Sixth Yearbook NAFA), p. 43:

"Far too much art teaching places major emphasis on formal values, on the "application" of design principles, on the exploration of materials, on the use of new media. I have no quarrel with any of these. Yet each one misses the heart of the art experience. I doubt for example, that most of the mobiles which are being turned out in such great numbers in art classes are anything but slight mechanical contrivances which leave the spirit of the producer untouched. I doubt that most of the design experiences which are a major stock-in-trade for many teachers involves much of the emotional feeling and attitudes of the students."



teacher must refrain from applying external pressures but must rather act as a helpful mediator between the student and his environment, helping him to discover his inborn tendencies and disposition and encouraging and assisting him in the directions of self-expression and self-realization that are revealed in his work.<sup>93</sup>

Freedom of expression -- however naive that expression may be at first -- must be the keynote at this initial stage, just as it is at the final stage of art education. The freedom in choice of subject-matter will be complemented by free experimentation with media -- by familiarization rather than by instruction.

This first step is advocated by Graham Collier in a recent book for which Sir Herbert Read indicates his endorsement in the Foreword:

The urge to draw is instinctive in all children. They use drawing as a very personal and intimate way of making statements about memory, about desire, and about mood. Accurate representation is generally not their concern. But as children grow up in our strongly rational civilization, in our verbal culture, their early affinity for personally created images dies away, and drawing becomes associated with "commercial" art, "industrial" art, or "fine" art. The philosophy of this book is that drawing should be used by beginning students to record their personal and instinctive reactions to all kinds of stimuli, whether initiated by the senses, by the intuition, by the emotions, or by the intellect.<sup>94</sup>

Lanier points out that this idea of self-expression has secured a firm foothold as an objective in theory of

---

<sup>93</sup>Keel, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>94</sup>Graham Collier, Form, Space, and Vision (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 2.



## art education in America:

The acceptance of this idea in art education imposed a considerable reorientation in teaching methods. Structured, authoritarian methods were obviously inconsistent with a goal of original, individual expression. Copying, cast drawing, and design exercises had to be replaced by more imaginative, pupil-motivated activities with malleable media.

Dewey discussed the idea in a volume written in 1930 (Construction and Criticism).

A recent report explains the concept of creative self-expression. "Creativity" implies a fresh response, unique to the creator; it is characterized by personal initiative and conscious effort; it involves thinking and doing according to self-applied tests; and is finally judged as an accurate expression of the initiator.<sup>95</sup>

Artist Henri Matisse echoes the views of the educators:

Thus for the artist, creation begins with vision. To see is itself a creative operation, requiring an effort. Everything that we see in our daily life is more or less distorted by acquired habits, and this is perhaps more evident in an age like ours when the cinema, posters and magazines present us everyday with a flood of ready-made images which are to the eye what prejudices are to the mind. The effort needed to see things without distortion takes something very like courage; and this courage is essential to the artist.<sup>96</sup>

The second step presenting a "minor objective" would be a refinement of the first step through simplification and exaggeration. As Lowenfeld says, "For the proper approach toward art experiences it is of vital importance to distinguish between what is essential and what is

---

<sup>95</sup>Lanier, op. cit., (Fifth Yearbook NAEA), p. 115.

<sup>96</sup>Henri Matisse, "The Nature of Creative Activity", A Symposium on Education and Art (Paris: UNESCO, 1953), p. 21.



unessential for the expression of an experience. Everything is essential which directly relates to the expression of the experience."<sup>97</sup> Collier points out that at this stage, expression must still be "spontaneous," but now it must also be "considered".<sup>98</sup> A main purpose here is the achievement of rudimentary organization or composition--- a stimulation of the individual's natural "urge for unification". However, in this activity concerned with "design," the student must always be kept aware of the greater goal of expressive "form".

In keeping with the broader Humanist cultural objectives, the process should involve appreciation of modes of expression used by people of other cultures. Lowenfeld presents various advantages of introducing such a study at this point:

Much of the confusion of adolescent critical awareness is due to the fact that in adolescent thinking, art must by all means establish a "realistic" relationship to environment, a relationship which develops a "true" (photographic) picture of the external world. The concept of "truth" should be established from as many angles as possible, especially with the help of works of art, of different epochs and cultures. It will then become evident that "truth" is relative, and that the word should be replaced by "sincerity". An African sculpture is as "true" to its creator as was the "David" to Michelangelo. The experience, however, which the African sculptor had with his work is vitally different from the experience Michelangelo had

---

<sup>97</sup>Lowenfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 260 - 261.

<sup>98</sup>Collier, *op. cit.*, p. 66.



when he created the "David." Thus it is the difference in the experience that determines art expression, whether it be painting, music, architecture, or any other art form. To show and demonstrate this relationship between experience and art work in the greatest possible varieties is one of the most important educational means that may eventuate in an unhampered interpretation of experiences.

A work of art is not a product of nature; it is product of human spirit, thinking, and emotions, and can only be understood when the driving forces which lead to its creation are understood.... These driving forces are of essential significance and everything else is only a by-product. If these driving forces are lacking, not even the most developed skills can ever replace them. That is why the works of the Primitives can be great works of art, while most skillfully executed works are not necessarily works of art if they lack the driving forces, the inner spirit that determines the greatness of an art work. They are like beautiful wrappers around nothing. It is therefore important to show the different qualities of these driving forces on the most diverse works of art of different epoches and cultures.<sup>99</sup>

A more technical study can now be safely undertaken as a third step. There are two phases to this "minor objective" in the process towards the development of truly creative art: first, the structural analysis of things; second, the perfection of techniques in handling media. These two will be discussed separately, although they will be developed simultaneously in the educative process.

The analytical study will arouse a realization of the details of things. The student will explore the potentialities of "subject-matter". In the process, as Collier points out, his perception should be quickened, and his

---

<sup>99</sup>Lowenfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 255 - 256.



emotional and intellectual participation should be aroused:

An awareness of structure directs our attention and interest to search for the inner, more permanent nature of the object. It helps us to recognize associational affinities with other objects and insures that we perceive more about an object than merely the shape of its external appearance. This is the importance of work in structural analysis.<sup>100</sup>

Collier goes on to illustrate the types of observations which the student should make. For instance, he should note the repetition of units in nature and the structural relationship of parts making up a whole.<sup>101</sup> In general, the Humanist emphasis on the "richness of earthly life" finds its place at this stage.<sup>102</sup> From the point of view of an artist, Matisse stresses the importance of acquiring this intimate association with the external world:

To create is to express what we have within ourselves. Every genuine creative effort comes from within. We have also to nourish our feeling, and we can do so only with material derived from the world about us. This is the process whereby the artist incorporates and gradually assimilates the external world within himself, until the object of his drawing has become like a part of his being, until he has it within him and can project it on to the canvas as his own.<sup>103</sup>

---

<sup>100</sup>Collier, op. cit., p. 59.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid., p. 98ff.

<sup>102</sup>Lamont, op. cit., p. 147ff.

<sup>103</sup>Matisse, loc. cit.



The perfection of techniques at this stage will involve a conscious consideration of the use of tools in executing design. The student will also explore the possibilities of various materials. He will look for media appropriate to the interpretation of discoveries made in structural analysis of subject-matter. For instance, as Collier suggests, the study would be incomplete if the student were not to experiment to determine the best means of achieving textural effects such as "hardness or softness, dryness or dampness, smoothness or roughness".<sup>104</sup> This study of techniques must always be related to a consideration of arousing strong "aesthetic response".<sup>105</sup>

Unhampered by a limited awareness of "subject-matter" or by an inadequate technical skill in "design," the student can now turn to the broader objectives of art education. At this stage, his emphasis will be on "form and content". He is now truly free to express himself. He is equipped to communicate his attitudes and feelings through non-verbal symbols and to view with sympathetic understanding the non-verbal communications of others. In this way he is able to enrich both his own life and that of others. He is free to make what contributions his

---

<sup>104</sup>Collier, op. cit., p. 121.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid.



abilities will permit in advancing the culture of his community, large or small.

At least these are the things which he will be able to do if the art program in his school is more than a "frill". Indeed, the evidence presented by art educators quoted in this thesis would indicate that the Humanist vision is on its way to becoming a reality. The educators of tomorrow should not fail if they assume their responsibilities of acting on a considered philosophy with sound educational objectives and a definite program of action.

In the light of modern development in technical research and in keeping with the Humanist faith in the scientific method, it appears evident that much more can be done in the future to ensure the success of the program in art education. A most fitting comment to bolster this hope is found in the words of Vincent Lanier taken from the NAEA Yearbook which was devoted to "Research in Art Education":

It should be perfectly clear today that our progress as an area of education must, from this time on, be structured upon the stable foundation of consistent and thorough research. It is no longer desirable to depend upon the insight and observation of individual pioneers alone. While it would seem that there will always be leadership in every area of human activity, leaders in the social sciences like those in the physical sciences must now build their conceptual innovations from verified hypotheses as to the nature of education through art. Research, buttressed by an



incessantly meticulous procedure, a sizable increase in scope and coordination, and the refinement of the tools of measurement employed, is our most important device for growth. Once we know where we are going and are all travelling together, committed to a rigorous scientific approach, there is no doubt that art education will assume its rightful place among those necessary experiences for the wholesome development of mankind.<sup>106</sup>

---

<sup>106</sup>Lanier, op. cit. (Ninth Yearbook NAFA), p. 115.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY



## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ENTRIES

## A. BOOKS

- Bell, Clive. Art. New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1913
- Benedict, Ruth. Patterns of Culture. New York: The New American Library, 1959.
- Cairs, Huntington, and John Walker (ed.). Masterpieces of Painting. New York: Random House, 1944.
- Collier, Graham. Form, Space, and Vision. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964
- Dark, Sidney. The Story of the Renaissance. New York: George H. Doran and Company, 1924.
- Dewey, John. Art as Experience. New York: Minton, Balch and Company, 1934.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Experience and Nature. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1926.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Modern Library, 1936.
- Durant, Will. The Story of Philosophy. New York: Garden City Publishing Company, 1943.
- Fry, Roger E. Vision and Design. Cambridge, Mass.: Murray Printing Company, 1947.
- Fuller, B. A. G. A History of Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938.
- Hart, Joseph K. A Social Interpretation of Education. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929.
- Hirn, Yrjo. The Origins of Art. New York: Macmillan Company, 1900.
- Huyghe, Rene (ed.). Art Treasures of the Louvre. New York: Harry N. Abrams Company, 1951.



- Lamont, Corliss. The Philosophy of Humanism. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957.
- Langer, Susanne K. Philosophy in a New Key. New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1946.
- Lowenfeld, Viktor. Creative and Mental Growth. New York: Macmillan Company, 1952.
- Maritain, Jacques. Art et Scholastique. Paris: Art Catholique, 1920.
- Meier-Graef, Julius. Cezanne. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927.
- Mumford, Lewis. Technics and Civilization. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1934.
- Murray, Gilbert. The Five Stages of Greek Religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925.
- Parker, Dewitt H. Human Values. Ann Arbor: George Wahr, 1944.
- Philipson, Morris. Aesthetics Today. Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1961.
- Randall, John H., Jr. The Making of the Modern Mind. Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1940.
- Read, Herbert. The Forms of Things Unknown. London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1958.
- Reese, Curtis. The Meaning of Humanism. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1945.
- Reiser, Oliver L. Man's Image of Man. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press, 1961.
- Rowley, George, et al. The Civilization of the Renaissance. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1929.
- Santayana, George. Life of Reason (Reason in Art). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Three Philosophical Poets. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1945.



- Shakespeare, William. A Midsummer-Night's Dream. Act V, Sc. i.
- Stone, Irving, The Lust for Life (The Life of Vincent Van Gogh). New York: Random House, 1939.
- Taylor, Francis H. (ed.) Fifty Centuries of Art. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954.
- Tolstoy, Leo. What is Art? New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1899.
- Wiener, Norbert. The Human Use of Human Beings (Cybernetics and Society). New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1954.

B. PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, LEARNED SOCIETIES  
AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

- A Humanist Manifesto. Chicago: The Humanist Press Association, 1933.
- Annual Report on Inspection and Supervision. Department of Education, Province of Alberta, 1950, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963.
- Keel, John S. "Sir Herbert Read's Theory of Aesthetic Education," Research in Art Education, pp. 21 - 26. Ninth Yearbook of the National Art Education Association. Edited by Jerome J. Hausman. Washington: Department of National Education, 1958.
- Lanier, Vincent. "A Commentary on Research into Teaching Process," Research in Art Education, pp. 112 - 115. Ninth Yearbook of the National Art Education Association. Edited by Jerome J. Hausman. Washington: Department of National Education, 1958.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Status of Current Objectives in Art Education," Research in Art Education, pp. 114 - 130. Fifth Yearbook of the National Art Education Association. Edited by Manuel Sarkar. Washington: Department of National Education, 1954.



- Matisse, Henri. "The Nature of Creative Activity,"  
A Symposium on Education and Art, pp. 21 - 22.  
 Edited by Edwin Ziegfeld. Paris: The United Nations  
 Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,  
 1953.
- Munro, Thomas. "Art and International Understanding,"  
A Symposium on Education and Art, pp. 116 - 117.  
 Edited by Edwin Ziegfeld. Paris: The United Nations  
 Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,  
 1953.
- Senior High School Curriculum Guide for Art. Department of  
 Education, Province of Alberta, 1958.
- Ziegfeld, Edwin. "International Freedom and Art Education,"  
Art Education a Frontier for Freedom, pp. 37 - 52.  
Sixth Yearbook of the National Art Education Association.  
 Edited by Horace F. Heilman. Washington:  
 Department of National Education, 1955.
- Ziegfeld, Edwin (ed.). "Introduction," A Symposium on  
Education and Art, pp. 15 - 17. Paris: The United  
 Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural  
 Organization, 1953.
- Ziegfeld, Ernest (ed.). Art and Human Values. Third  
Yearbook of the National Art Education Association.  
 Washington: Department of National Education, 1953.

#### C. NEWSPAPERS

- Edmonton Journal, April 1 to 5, 1943 to 1947 (inclusive).
- \_\_\_\_\_. April 1 to 7, 1960 to 1964 (inclusive).



## APPENDIX



## APPENDIX A

TABLE

## SUMMARY OF SURVEY OF COVERAGE ON ART IN THE EDMONTON JOURNAL

## I. Coverage in Inches for the First Week of April, 1960 to 1964

Year	Art	Music	Drama & Literature	Total on the Arts
1964	89	121 $\frac{3}{4}$	113	323 $\frac{3}{4}$
1963	123	33 $\frac{1}{4}$	143 $\frac{3}{4}$	300
1962	55 $\frac{1}{4}$	149	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	281 $\frac{3}{4}$
1961	46 $\frac{1}{4}$	142 $\frac{3}{4}$	28 $\frac{3}{4}$	217 $\frac{3}{4}$
1960	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	185 $\frac{1}{4}$	61 $\frac{1}{4}$	370 $\frac{1}{4}$
Totals:	437	632	424 $\frac{1}{2}$	1493 $\frac{1}{2}$
Average per week for 5-year period	87.4	126.4	84.9	298.7

## II. Coverage in Inches for the First Week of April, 1943 to 1947

Year	Art	Music	Drama & Literature	Total on the Arts
1947	0	18	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	25 $\frac{1}{2}$
1946	30	75	0	105
1945	47 $\frac{3}{4}$	44 $\frac{3}{4}$	5 $\frac{3}{4}$	98 $\frac{1}{4}$
1944	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	24	69 $\frac{3}{4}$
1943	0	43 $\frac{3}{4}$	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	52 $\frac{1}{4}$
Totals:	79	226	45 $\frac{3}{4}$	350 $\frac{3}{4}$
Average per week for 5-year period	15.8	45.2	9.25	70.25



## APPENDIX B

FINDINGS FROM A PARENTAL OPINION SURVEY  
IN THE PINCHER CREEK SCHOOL DIVISION

In 1958 the Superintendent of Schools for the Pincher Creek School Division conducted a Parental Opinion Survey in that area. This study revealed several significant facts concerning the attitude of the parents towards the art courses offered in the high schools:

- (a) Although Art 30 had not yet been added to the Grade XII curriculum, no one suggested it as a course which should be included. (Additional courses suggested were: Driver Education for 3 credits, Catechism for 5, Principles of Accounting for 5, and Arithmetic for 2.)
- (b) 79.2% of the parents assigned no instruction time for Art 20 (Grade XI). In the total count, it placed fifth from the bottom in course preference.
- (c) 68.6% assigned no instruction time for Art 10 (Grade X). It placed eighth from the bottom in course preference.
- (d) However, some parents indicated that they would give both Art 10 and Art 20 a 5-credit value. (The average credit value assigned to Art 10 was  $2/3$  and to Art 20, 2.4.)



## APPENDIX C

THE ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION  
ON INSPECTION AND SUPERVISION

Those reports which do mention art, all point up the general weakness of the courses as they are now offered in the schools of Alberta:

- (a) 1950 Report, p. 40: The three fields of Art, Music and dramatics find favor as elective subjects. Of the three, the quality of instruction in Music may be considered superior. This results from the fact that the content is more specific and familiar, with the needed equipment usually available. The teaching of Art tends to be formal and technical rather than creative, concerned with establishing principles rather than with actual experience in sketching and painting from still-life or models.
- (b) 1960 Report, p. 32: Art work was aided by school broadcasts and in a few divisions by art supervisors or special teachers who were able to exchange subjects with other teachers. Formal Art lessons were carried out in a perfunctory manner in many classrooms but recent graduates have manifested a more philosophical regard for a creative expression. Many teachers, lacking security and training in technique, hesitate to permit pupils to experiment. Yet it is reported that there were many commendable displays of painting and modelling. Spirit River Division held an Art Contest. Conclusions indicated a greater need of suitable equipment such as easels, large counters or tilting tables, drawing boards, suitable paper, and brushes.
- (c) 1961 Report, p. 48: Comments on art instruction were few. One superintendent spoke about the importance of creative art with stress on stimulation rather than on product; another mentioned art in relation to enterprise; a third told about formal instruction in Grade V and VI. In-service training in one school system included eleven evening workshops to enable teachers to observe new techniques. Filmstrips were used effectively to encourage art appreciation.
- (d) 1962 Report, p. 24: The effectiveness of instruction in the fine arts varied greatly from classroom to classroom in accordance with the special training, enthusiasm, and talents of the teachers of these subjects. Instruction suffered from a serious shortage of teachers with these special qualification, especially in music. The ascendancy of the academic



subjects and the consequent relegation of the fine arts subjects to a secondary position in the school program, were other significant factors affecting the quality of instruction in the fine arts.

Marked improvements were achieved in a number of schools by arranging to have staff members with special qualifications in the fine arts subjects give instruction in several classrooms. In-service projects related to the fine arts also led to renewed teacher interest and improved instruction. A superior quality of instruction was possible in some larger junior high schools where departmentalization of instruction permitted the assignment of well-qualified teachers to the fine arts classes.

The usual time allotment for art instruction was two or three weekly periods. In the majority of junior high schools students were given the opportunity to take art as one of the exploratory subjects at least once during their junior high years.

Much of the art activity in the elementary grades was related to other subjects. The display of pupils' art work and the well-illustrated notebooks observed in many classrooms indicated a considerable degree of pupil creativeness and enjoyment. The main criticism of art instruction was the insufficiency of a systematic and sequential development of techniques and skills through the grades and of the exploratory use of a wide range of art media in the junior high classes.

- (e) 1963 Report, p. 32: Lack of qualified personnel has limited the program. Those systems with teachers who have special talents in fine arts either make them supervisors to help other teachers or place them in charge of one of the programs.



## APPENDIX D

## A HUMANIST MANIFESTO (1933)

This Manifesto first appeared in The New Humanist for May-June, 1933. (Vol. VI, No. 3.) It was an endeavor to clarify the religious philosophy generally known as Humanism without setting up a final dogma. More recently the desire expressed by some to revise this statement led to coast to coast consultation among humanists under the auspices of the Humanist Press Association which owned and published The New Humanist. The result was the conclusion to leave the Manifesto unchanged and, as originally intended, a dated document representing a sounding of views taken at a particular time of a movement which has always been kept self-critical and in a state of flux. Plans are now under way for the development of a new statement supplementary to the Manifesto.

If any revision of the Manifesto appears, therefore, it will not be representative of the humanist movement. Those who desire to quote or reproduce the Manifesto in whole or part are asked to communicate with the Humanist Press Association and to make due acknowledgement to that organization. In response to widespread demand we are making this reproduction, in reduced size, from the original pages of The New Humanist.

## THE NEW HUMANIST

## A HUMANIST MANIFESTO

The time has come for widespread recognition of the radical changes in religious beliefs throughout the modern world. The time is past for mere revision of traditional attitudes. Science and economic change have disrupted the old beliefs. Religions the world over are under the necessity of coming to terms with new conditions created by a vastly increased knowledge and experience. In every field of human activity, the vital movement is now in the direction of a candid and explicit humanism. In order that religious humanism may be better understood we, the undersigned, desire to make certain affirmations which we believe the facts of our contemporary life demonstrate.

There is great danger of a final, and we believe fatal, identification of the word religion with doctrines and methods which have lost their significance and which are powerless to solve the problem of human living in the Twentieth Century. Religions have always been means for realizing the



highest values of life. Their end has been accomplished through the interpretation of the total environing situation (theology or world view), the sense of values resulting therefrom (goal or ideal), and the technique (cult), established for realizing the satisfactory life. A change in any of these factors results in alteration of the outward forms of religion. This fact explains the changefulness of religions through the centuries. But through all changes religion itself remains constant in its quest for abiding values, an inseparable feature of human life.

Today man's larger understanding of the universe, his scientific achievements, and his deeper appreciation of brotherhood, have created a situation which requires a new statement of the means and purposes of religion. Such a vital, fearless, and frank religion capable of furnishing adequate social goals and personal satisfactions may appear to many people as a complete break with the past. While this age does owe a vast debt to the traditional religions, it is none the less obvious that any religion that can hope to be a synthesizing and dynamic force for today must be shaped for the needs of this age. To establish such a religion is a major necessity of the present. It is a responsibility which rests upon this generation. We therefore affirm the following:

First: Religious humanists regard the universe as self-existing and not created.

Second: Humanism believes that man is a part of nature and that he has emerged as the result of a continuous process.

Third: Holding an organic view of life, humanists find that the traditional dualism of mind and body must be rejected.

Fourth: Humanism recognizes that man's religious culture and civilization, as clearly depicted by anthropology and history, are the product of a gradual development due to his interaction with his natural environment and with his social heritage. The individual born into a particular culture is largely molded by that culture.

Fifth: Humanism asserts that the nature of the universe depicted by modern science makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantees of human values. Obviously humanism does not deny the possibility of realities as yet undiscovered, but it does insist that the way to determine the existence and value of any and all realities is by means of intelligent inquiry and by the assessment of their relation to human needs. Religion must formulate its hopes and plans in the light of the scientific spirit and method.



Sixth: We are convinced that the time has passed for theism, deism, modernism, and the several varieties of "new thought."

Seventh: Religion consists of those actions, purposes, and experiences which are humanly significant. Nothing human is alien to the religious. It includes labor, art, science, philosophy, love, friendship, recreation -- all that is in its degree expressive of intelligently satisfying human living. The distinction between the sacred and the secular can no longer be maintained.

Eighth: Religious humanism considers the complete realization of human personality to be the end of man's life and seeks its development and fulfillment in the here and now. This is the explanation of the humanist's social passion.

Ninth: In place of the old attitudes involved in worship and prayer the humanist finds his religious emotions expressed in a heightened sense of personal life and in a cooperative effort to promote social well-being.

Tenth: It follows that there will be no uniquely religious emotions and attitudes of the kind hitherto associated with belief in the supernatural.

Eleventh: Man will learn to face the crises of life in terms of his knowledge of their naturalness and probability. Reasonable and manly attitudes will be fostered by education and supported by custom. We assume that humanism will take the path of social and mental hygiene and discourage sentimental and unreal hopes and wishful thinking.

Twelfth: Believing that religion must work increasingly for joy in living, religious humanists aim to foster the creative in man and to encourage achievements that add to the satisfactions of life.

Thirteenth: Religious humanism maintains that all associations and institutions exist for the fulfillment of human life. The intelligent evaluation, transformation, control, and direction of such associations and institutions with a view to the enhancement of human life is the purpose and program of humanism. Certainly religious institutions, their ritualistic forms, ecclesiastical methods, and communal activities must be reconstituted as rapidly as experience allows, in order to function effectively in the modern world.

Fourteenth: The Humanists are firmly convinced that existing acquisitive and profit-motivated society has shown itself to be inadequate and that a radical change in methods, controls, and motives must be instituted. A socialized and cooperative economic order must be established to the end that the equitable distribution of the means of life be possible. The goal of humanism is a free and universal society in which people voluntarily and intelligently cooperate for the good. Humanists demand a shared life in a shared world.



Fifteenth and last. We assert that humanism will:  
 (a) affirm life rather than deny it. (b) seek to elicit the possibilities of life, not flee from it. and (c) endeavor to establish the conditions of a satisfactory life for all, not merely for the few. By this positive morale and intention humanism will be guided, and from this perspective and alignment the techniques and efforts of humanism will flow.

So stand the theses of religious humanism. Though we consider the religious forms and ideas of our fathers no longer adequate, the quest for the good life is still the central task for mankind. Man is at last becoming aware that he alone is responsible for the realization of the world of his dreams, that he has within himself the power for its achievement. He must set intelligence and will to the task.

(Signed)

J. A. C. Fagginger Auer	Parkman Professor of Church History and Theology, Harvard University; Professor of Church History, Tufts College.
E. Burdette Backus	Unitarian Minister.
Harry Elmer Barnes	General Editorial Department, Scripps-Howard Newspapers.
L. M. Birkhead	The Liberal Center, Kansas City, Missouri.
Raymond B. Bragg	Secretary, Western Unitarian Conference.
Edwin Arthur Burtt	Professor of Philosophy, Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University.
Ernest Caldecott	Minister, First Unitarian Church, Los Angeles, California.
A. J. Carlson	Professor of Physiology, University of Chicago.
John Dewey	Columbia University.
Albert C. Dieffenbach	Formerly Editor of <u>The Christian Register</u> .
John H. Dietrich	Minister, First Unitarian Society, Minneapolis.
Bernard Fantus	Professor of Therapeutics, College of Medicine, University of Illinois.
William Floyd	Editor of <u>The Arbitrator</u> , New York City.
F. H. Hankins	Professor of Economics and Sociology, Smith College.
A. Eustace Haydon	Professor of History of Religions, University of Chicago.
Llewellyn Jones	Literary critic and author.
Robert Morss Lovett	Editor, <u>The New Republic</u> ; Professor of English, University of Chicago.



Harold P. Marley	Minister, The Fellowship of Liberal Religion, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
R. Lester Mondale	Minister, Unitarian Church, Evanston, Illinois.
Charles Francis Potter	Leader and Founder, the First Humanist Society of New York, Inc.
John Herman Randall, Jr.	Department of Philosophy, Columbia University.
Curtis W. Reese	Dean, Abraham Lincoln Center, Chicago.
Oliver L. Reiser	Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh.
Roy Wood Sellars	Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan.
Clinton Lee Scott	Minister, Universalist Church, Peoria, Illinois.
Maynard Shipley	President, The Science League of America.
W. Frank Swift	Director, Boston Ethical Society.
V. T. Thayer	Educational Director, Ethical Culture Schools.
Eldred C. Vanderlaan	Leader of the Free Fellowship, Berkeley, California.
Joseph Walker	Attorney, Boston Massachusetts.
Jacob J. Weinstein	Rabbi, Advisor to Jewish Students, Columbia University.
Frank S. C. Wicks	All Souls Unitarian Church, Indianapolis.
David Rhys Williams	Minister, Unitarian Church, Rochester, New York.
Edwin H. Wilson	Managing Editor, <u>The New Humanist</u> , Chicago, Illinois; Minister, Third Unitarian Church, Chicago, Illinois.

## NOTE

The Manifesto is a product of many minds. It was designed to represent a developing point of view, not a new creed. The individuals whose signatures appear, would, have they been writing individual statements, have stated the propositions in differing terms. The importance of the document is that more than thirty men have come to general agreement on matters of final concern and that these men are undoubtedly representative of a large number who are forging a new philosophy out of the materials of the modern world.

It is obvious that many others might have been asked to sign the Manifesto had not the lack of time and the shortage of clerical assistance limited our ability to communicate with them. The names of several who were asked do not appear. Reasons for their absence appear elsewhere in this issue of



"The New Humanist". Further criticisms that we have been unable to publish have reached us; all of them we value. We invite an expression of opinion from others. To the extent possible "The New Humanist" will publish such materials.

Raymond B. Bragg.

The Humanist Press Association

301 North Mayfield Avenue, Chicago, Illinois





**B29825**